Fighting tax havens and climate change by ElSayyad, May
Fighting Tax Havens and Climate Change
INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION
zur Erlangung des Grades Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr.oec.publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
(2012)
vorgelegt von
May ElSayyad
Referent: Prof. Dr. Kai A. Konrad
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Monika Schnitzer
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 7. November 2012

Acknowledgments
This thesis was mainly written at the Department of Public Economics of the Max
Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance. For this opportunity, I would like
to thank Kai Konrad. I have known Kai Konrad as supervisor and co-author and
I am especially grateful for his patience, unending support and countless feedback
rounds. He is an inspiring teacher and I am thankful for him pushing me forward
in all my endeavours. I would also like to thank my second supervisor, Monika
Schnitzer, for allowing me to present my projects in front of an interested audience,
for her thoughtful suggestions and for agreeing to co-supervise this work.
I am also indebted to Frank Cowell and Henrik Cleven for making my research
stay at the London School of Economics possible and giving me the opportunity to
expand both my research and personal horizon.
I would not have been able to complete this thesis without Florian Morath, Nadja
Dwenger and Salmai Qari. I would like to thank Florian Morath, my co-author,
for his support and encouragement. He has been inspiring in his quest for concise
prose and formal elegance. For mastering my econometric techniques and thinking
about data, I am especially grateful to Nadja Dwenger and Salmai Qari. Their
passion for data and econometrics has been contagious and I have enjoyed our fruitful
discussions.
Moreover, I would like to thank my colleagues at the Max Planck Institute Sabine
Aresin, Johannes Becker, Anne-Kathrin Bronsert, Thomas Daske, Athina Grigori-
adou, Luisa Herbst, Michael Hilmer, Changxia Ke, Philipp Meyer-Brauns, Rhea
Molato and Fangfang Tan for numerous discussions and encouraging words. I am
also indebted to Bernhard Enzi, David Houser, Sarah Marfeld and Daniela Miehling
for helpful research assistance.
Special thanks go to my parents and sisters, who, with their unwavering support,
have made me unafraid of the challenges ahead of me. For accompanying all my ups
and downs on this journey, I would also like to thank Dominik.
Last but not least, I would like to thank the German Research Foundation (GRK
801) and the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance for the nancial
support.
Munich, 2012
iv

Contents
List of Figures iv
List of Tables v
1 Introduction 1
2 Fighting Multiple Tax Havens 8
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 The structure of the problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Equilibrium in Phase 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Equilibrium in Phase 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.1 Deactivation of only one tax haven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.2 Deactivation of all tax havens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 Deactivation equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5.1 Simultaneous joint o¤ers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.2 Independent sequential o¤ers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
i
Contents
2.5.3 Comparing o¤er regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 Bargaining over Tax Information Exchange 42
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Institutional setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 A simple bargaining framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4 Empirical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4.1 Estimation strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4.2 Agreement form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4.3 Haven-specic characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.4 Country pair-specic characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.1 Benchmark estimations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.2 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.6 Discussion and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.7 Regression Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4 Climate Uncertainty, Irreversibility and Technology Sharing 75
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
ii
Contents
4.2 Model framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3 Contributions to Climate Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3.1 Preferred provision levels in period t+ 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3.2 Preferred provision levels in period t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3.3 Equilibrium contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.4 Isolating the e¤ects on timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.5 Investments in technology and the timing of contributions . . . . . . 95
4.5.1 Categorical changes in the preferred period t contributions . . 96
4.5.2 Technology sharing to free-ride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A Appendix to Chapter 3 110
A.1 Data Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
A.2 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
B Appendix to Chapter 4 117
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
B.2 E¤ect of technology on (positive) contribution levels . . . . . . . . . . 119
References 121
iii
List of Figures
2.1 Game set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1 Categorical changes in the preferred provision level. . . . . . . . . . 100
4.2 An example of categorical changes for two countries. . . . . . . . . . 101
4.3 An example of two cumulative distribution functions. . . . . . . . . 106
iv
List of Tables
3.1 Benchmark Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.2 Probit Regression for DTC Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3 Probit Regression for TIEA Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4 Foreign Direct Investment net outow (% of GDP) . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5 Savings Tax Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.6 Excluding OECD tax haven countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.7 Excluding Nordic countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.8 Population-averaged marginal e¤ects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
A.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
A.2 Haven DTCs And TIEAs signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
v
Chapter 1
Introduction
The increasingly intertwined global relationships of goods, services, people and ac-
tivities have rendered domestic legislation and policymaking which only extends to
national borders insu¢ cient. In fact, according to the OECD, the biggest chal-
lenges of the 21st century are of a global nature and demand a global approach.1 A
successful global strategy, however, can only be achieved by extensive and detailed
multilateral coordination. Hence, an international initiative is needed to rst iden-
tify the main challenges of a global approach and then introduce instruments that
can be used for coordination. This thesis analyzes the consequences of policies and
mechanisms introduced by multilateral initiatives using two examples, one in the
eld of international taxation and the other in the eld of climate policy.
The need for an international initiative stems from the fact that activities are
no longer necessarily bound by geographical or political borders. This phenomenon
creates an externality which national legislators cannot take into account. The inef-
ciency arises due to the fact that, by denition of an externality, agents are unable
1The OECDs Future Programme report international terrorism, pandemic outbreaks,
nancial crises and climate change as the main challenges of the 21st century. See OECD
(2003).
1
Chapter 1. Introduction
to fully internalize the costs or benets of their actions. Consequently, due to such
externalities, international cooperation is hampered by a reality wherein the strategic
interactions between jurisdictions generate incentives to not cooperate.
In the era of globalization and stronger economic integration, the facilitation of
cross-border investment has been achieved by a reduction of capital controls and
restrictions.2 In tax policy, this has introduced competitive pressure on jurisdictions
wishing to attract mobile capital and investment. Accordingly, the theory of inter-
national competition depicts a scenario in which countries mutually undercut each
other in their tax rates in a Bertrand like race to the bottom.3 In this context, a
scal externality exists as higher tax rates in one country drive capital out of this
country and into other countries. These countries, then, benet from this increase
in tax rates by broadening their tax base and increasing their tax revenue. Trapped
into this "race to the bottom", tax rates and tax revenues are ine¢ ciently low.4 Con-
sequently, in order for countries to achieve a more e¢ cient equilibrium they must
coordinate to jointly increase their tax rates. In practice, the multilateral OECDs
Harmful Tax Practices Initiative was started to provide a thorough analysis of the
deleterious e¤ect of tax competition and to provide a framework within which coun-
tries might work together in order to eliminate harmful tax practices. The OECD
report developed a set of guidelines for member countries by which to identify, report
and eliminate the harmful aspects of tax competition. Tax havens have been identi-
ed by the OECD report as serious drivers of tax competition. They are dened as
jurisdictions which levy no or very low taxes on mobile capital and have strong bank
secrecy rules, no transparency and no e¤ective exchange of information on mobile
2See OECD (2002)
3See Wildasin (1988,1991), Wilson (1986) and Bucovetsky (1991).
4Oates (1972) identies the harmful aspect of tax competition as springinh from the
fact that due to ine¢ ciently low tax rates and tax revenues an ine¢ ciently low level of the
public good is provided.
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activities.5 Amajor contribution of the initiative has been the development of a clear
denition and criteria for the identication of tax havens and the proposal of a legal
framework through which countries can deal with the tax haven phenomenon. Given
that tax havens can be perceived as specializing in capital concealment activities,
the introduction of a mechanism that facilitates the exchange of information can
be a useful and e¤ective tool to counteract their tax haven activities. Notice that
by sharing information, a correct estimation of each individuals tax burden would
be possible. In this thesis, we particularly study the implications of the implemen-
tation of the information exchange mechanism. The literature on tax havens has
mainly concentrated on the welfare e¤ects of the tax havens phenomenon and has
disregarded the proposed initiatives put forward that deal with tax havens.6 Thus,
this thesis contributes to the literature on tax havens by providing a theoretically
founded analysis of the proposed mechanism and its implementation. We use both
non-cooperative game theory and empirical methods to understand the implications
of the implementation of the proposed information exchange mechanism.
Climate policy, as the second topic which this thesis covers, presents a classic case
of positive externalities as the benets of climate mitigation e¤orts cannot be lim-
ited to one country. Given that climate protection is a global public good, countries
have an incentive to free-ride on the contribution of others and, as a result, con-
tributions to climate protection are ine¢ ciently low. In order to increase the level
of overall climate protection, international cooperation and coordination is needed.
However, questions of climate policy adoption are further complicated by timing
considerations. Countries are faced with the decision of when to adopt climate mit-
igation policies, given that the extent of the damage of climate change is unknown
but waiting for more information might prove to be too costly. On the international
policy agenda, climate policy has long been identied as a topic where international
5See OECD (1998) p.19.
6See Dharmapala (2008).
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coordination is crucial. In 1992 the United Nations Framework Convention for Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC), an international environmental treaty with the objective
of stabilizing "greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system", was opened
to signature. To achieve this type of stabilization, the UNFCCC identied two main
dimensions of cooperation: rst, the commitment to binding CO2 emission reduction
targets and, second, the support of green technology and technology transfer initia-
tives.7 In this thesis, we focus on the technology dimension of the UNFCCC. The
support for technology sharing and technology transfer initiatives has been clearly
documented in Article 4.5 of the United Nations Convention for Climate Change.8
While the commitment to a new binding CO2 reduction agreement has remained an
elusive goal, there have been both widespread national and international initiatives
that support green technology and technology sharing mechanisms.9 Literature in
favour of national and international support of investments in climate protection
normally does not take the strategic context of climate protection into account but
allows for an investment in new markets argument.10 In fact, in a strategic context, a
particularly robust theoretical nding of the literature is that countries should strate-
gically keep their costs of contributing high. The rationale is that a country with a
higher contribution cost can free-ride on the other countriescontributions.11In this
thesis, we contribute to this debate by analyzing a technology sharing scheme which
takes into account the strategic context of climate protection e¤ects and but also
7The Stern Review (2006) identied a technology-based scheme as indispensable for
e¤ectively tackling climate change.
8Article 4.5 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change states that
countries "shall take all practical steps to promote, facilitate and nance, as appropriate,
the transfer of, or access to environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other
parties."
9See Moselle et al. (2010) for an overview.
10 See Ja¤e et al. (2003) for a survey and Ulph and Ulph (2006,2007).
11See the seminal work by Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Cornes and Sandler (1985). on
private contribution to international public goods and see Bucholz and Konrad (1994,1995)
for the strategic e¤ect of technology on climate protection in the same framework.
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includes the important timing considerations that countriesface when deciding over
policy adoption.
This thesis uses non-cooperative methods to analyze existing structures and poli-
cies introduced via a multilateral initiative in the eld of tax policy and climate
policy. The second and third chapters study the OECDs strategy to counteracting
tax havens. Specically, the second chapter theoretically analyzes the OECDs strat-
egy and process of closing down the tax havenscapital concealment activities, while
the third chapter attempts to empirically analyze the main mechanisms driving the
implementation process of the closure of tax haven activities of jurisdictions. The
fourth chapter spurred on by the continuing success of the UNFCCC strategy to
support technology transfer initiatives analyzes the e¤ects of the technology sharing
of unilateral investments in green technology on the timing of and contributions to
climate protection. In the following, we present the main results from each chapter
of the thesis. Each chapter is self-contained and can be read independently.
In Chapter 2, using a competition theory framework, we compare the sequential
approach of closing down tax haven activities with a simultaneous and coordinated
approach. The main argument presented in this chapter is that the deactivation
of some tax havens (in the sense of compliance with OECD information exchange
rules) has implications for other tax havensbusiness opportunities. By closing down
a majority of tax havens, the equilibrium payo¤s of the tax havens that remain active
increase, making it more attractive for them to continue their business. We show
that this market concentration e¤ect makes the process of closing down the tax haven
business of one tax haven country after the other particularly costly, compared to a
simultaneous and coordinated all-at-once approach. In reality, the implementation
process of including tax information exchange articles to existing agreements or the
signing of agreements has been rather slow and sequential in nature. Consequently,
the analysis reveals a hidden cost to the sequential process that is not obvious from
5
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the outset. Furthermore, our analysis also incorporates asymmetric tax havens and
shows that, given a sequential implementation pattern, and from the perspective
of the overall cost, it is less costly to approach larger havens rst; a nding which
does not correspond to the pattern of recent Tax Information Exchange Agreement
(TIEA) signings.
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, we provide a more detailed analysis of the legal vehicle
proposed by the OECD Harmful Tax Practices Initiative; the signing of a TIEA or
the inclusion of an information exchange clause to a Double Taxation Convention
(DTC). We analyze the main factors determining the signing of an agreement: the
outcome of a bargaining process between tax havens and high tax countries. Anecdo-
tal evidence and analysis of di¤erent treaty forms show that a tax haven would rather
sign an information exchange treaty which also facilitates cross-border investment
(DTC) than sign a treaty which only regulates information exchange (TIEA). Tak-
ing this into account, we use a highly stylized bargaining model to develop testable
hypotheses with regard to the type of agreement signed. The theoretical model
identies the general bargaining position of a tax haven versus a high tax country,
the e¤ectiveness of the defensive measures that can be used by the high tax country
against a tax haven and the share of capital, which is evaded in the tax haven country,
as the main drivers of the bargaining outcome. Taking these insights to the data,
we argue that the countriesbargaining positions are a function of each countrys
respective economic position, while the e¤ectiveness of the defensive measures is a
function of the strength of the bilateral relationship. Using an ordered maximum
likelihood regression model, our empirical analysis conrms the theoretically derived
hypotheses. Specically, a havens bargaining position is signicantly correlated with
a lower number of signed agreements and the potential of defensive measures does
have a positive impact on the compliance of tax havens, albeit to a smaller measure
than the haven-specic characteristics. Consequently, these empirical ndings can
be used to give a deeper analysis of the progress of the ght against tax havens. The
6
Chapter 1. Introduction
recent success in the ght against tax havens has been to a large degree buoyed by
smaller tax havens complying with international tax and transparency standards. A
particular challenge, which the study has put forward, is that the size of a havens
economic sector has a positive impact on its bargaining power. Taking into account
that this e¤ect is found when controlling for the bilateral nancial relationship, this
seems to suggest that stronger multilateral coordination and instruments are needed
when dealing with larger havens.
Chapter 4 leaves the tax policy sphere and tackles the issues of the timing of
contributions to climate protection and the e¤ects of technology sharing initiatives
on these timing considerations. In this chapter we show that investment in cost-
reducing technologies, which can be shared and a¤ect the costs of both countries
identically, can inuence the timing decision of the contribution to climate protec-
tion di¤erently. Our contribution is twofold. First, we extend the framework of
private provision to a public good game to a model that incorporates the important
trade-o¤ that countries face when deciding on climate policies; uncertainty versus
irreversibility of damages. We derive the equilibrium contributions to climate pro-
tection and identify the main mechanisms driving the timing of the contribution
decision. Second, we analyze, for the case of technology sharing, how an investment
in cost-reducing technology by one country alters the timing decision of the contri-
bution to climate protection game. We identify two scenarios wherein a country can
invest in cost-reducing technology in order to free-ride on the other countrys contri-
bution. As countries can withstand di¤erent degrees of irreversibility of damages, we
show that by a targeted use of cost-reducing technology, countries can switch from
one equilibrium candidate to another. Specically, countries can achieve an equilib-
rium candidate which allows them to free-ride on the other countrys contribution.
7
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Fighting Multiple Tax Havens
This chapter is based on joint work with Kai A. Konrad.1
2.1 Introduction
The OECD report on Harmful Tax Competition (1998, p. 23) worked out a number
of factors that may be used for identifying tax havens. One of these factors is
existing national bank secrecy rules which have been utilized to support tax haven
activities. Such rules protect investors "against scrutiny by tax authorities, thereby
preventing the e¤ective exchange of information on taxpayers beneting from the
low tax jurisdiction" and e¤ectively enable investors to avoid paying the respective
capital income taxes in their country of residence. Since the 1990s several initiatives
have been launched against tax havens by the OECD, the G8, the United Nations
O¢ ce for Drug Control and Crime Prevention and the European Union, in response.
Most prominent is the 1998 OECD initiative subsequently known as the Harmful
1See Elsayyad and Konrad (2012).
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Tax Practices Initiative which was intended to discourage the use of preferential tax
regimes for foreign investors and to encourage e¤ective information exchange among
the tax authorities of di¤erent countries. As part of the initiative, the OECD pro-
duced a list of countries and territories that it deemed to be tax havens. Over the
years OECD attitudes with regards to tax havens shifted from confrontational to co-
operative. OECD and non-OECD countries have worked together to develop mutual
standards of transparency and exchange of information, which have come to serve as
a model for a vast majority of the 3600 bilateral tax conventions entered into by the
OECD and non-OECD countries and may now be considered as the international
norm for tax cooperation (see, e.g., Kudrle 2008). If this information exchange is
su¢ ciently e¤ective, this would close down the respective countrys activities as a
tax haven. The dynamic process of implementation of these agreements, however,
stretches over many years. Between 2000 and the London Summit Declaration in
2009, only 100 Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) had been signed
between OECD countries and the nancial centers; furthermore, these signings for
the most part have been limited to a small number of countries. Despite the surge
in TIEA signings, which has taken place in the months after the London Summit,
it is evident that not all agreements were made simultaneously, and the process is
far from being complete. The ght against tax havens has been characterized by a
sequential pattern, and agreements have not been conditioned on each other.
We compare the sequential approach taken with a simultaneous coordinated ap-
proach of e¤ectively closing down tax haven activity (i.e., by enforcing appropriate
information exchange institutions). Exitby some tax havens (in the sense of com-
plying with OECD information exchange rules) has implications for other tax havens
business opportunities. Tax havens compete with each other for customers and their
capital. If the vast majority of competitors exits the tax haven business, the equilib-
rium payo¤s of the tax havens that remain active increase, making it more attractive
for them to continue their business. We show that this market concentration e¤ect
9
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makes the process of closing down the tax haven business of one tax haven coun-
try after the other particularly costly, compared to a simultaneous and coordinated,
all-in-one approach.
The OECD and other supranational entities engaged in the ght against tax
havens may not have the option of an all-in-one approach. But for this case our
analysis reveals a hidden cost of the sequential process that is not obvious from the
outset.2 Taking estimates of possible parameter values, we show that a sequential
approach can be 1.5 times more costly than a simultaneous conditional approach.
Furthermore, we show that given a sequential implementation pattern, from the
perspective of the overall cost, it is less costly to approach larger havens rst. A
nding which does not correspond to the pattern of recent TIEA signings.
The public nance literature on tax havens has so far concentrated on the welfare
implications of corporate tax planning and avoidance. The standard view underlying
the OECD initiative is that tax havens may strengthen tax competition and erode the
tax revenues of non-tax-haven countries.3 Some of the literature also reveals possible
countervailing e¤ects suggesting that tax havens may actually provide benets as
well.4 A diversity of views exists that is surveyed by Dharmapala (2008). However,
this literature basically takes tax havens (typically one) as a given.5 Slemrod and
Wilson (2009) take a negative view on tax havens and account for the existence of
multiple tax havens and tax haven ghting expenditures. To our knowledge this
2The problem entered into the policy discussion only very recently. An example is
Rosenzweig (2012, p.729) who acknowledges: "It only takes one tax haven in the world to
undermine a cooperative dynamic among other countries in the world."
3A formal analysis along these lines is provided by Slemrod and Wilson (2009). For an
analysis focusing on the harmful e¤ects for developing countries see Torvik (2009).
4See, e.g., Hong and Smart (2010), Desai et al. (2006) and Johannesen (2010).
5Slemrod (2008) provides an empirical analysis of the possible factors (including in-
come, literacy, development aid, size or whether a country is an island) that make it more
or less likely that a country engages in activities as a tax haven (following the OECD
classication).
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literature disregards the role of competition and market concentration between tax
havens and the change in competition that emerges from the OECD policy that tries
to change the set of tax havens. However, it is exactly this e¤ect which needs to be
taken into consideration in the process of closing down tax haven operations.6
For a description of competition between tax havens we adopt the formal structure
of Bertrand markets with subsets of price sensitive and loyal or partially uninformed
consumers, building on the fundamental insights of Varian (1980). More speci-
cally, we rely on the competition model by Narasimhan (1988).7 Tax competition is
typically described as a variant of competition in tax rates (i.e., in "prices"). The
Varian/Narasimhan framework is a natural generalization of such Bertrand compe-
tition, with the standard Bertrand type of competition as a special case. This more
general structure is su¢ cient to map a continuum of competition regimes, ranging
from local monopolies to standard Bertrand price competition (which is closest to
the standard approach in the tax competition literature), and it is suitable to con-
sider the competition and market concentration e¤ects stemming from policies that
deactivate tax-haven activities for a subset of tax havens.
The implications of these changes in market concentration for a simultaneous or
sequential inactivation of tax havens are the main drivers of our results. Changes
in market concentration play a major role in many other areas of international eco-
nomics. Merger or exit by some competitors in a given market generates externalities
to other competitors and also inuences othersmerger or exit decisions. These ef-
fects have been explored along a large variety of dimensions. Examples in contexts
6Considerable research has taken place to understand the economics of bilateral versus
multilateral trade negotiations and agreements, see for example Bagwell and Staiger (2010).
Research involving bilateral tax treaties has mainly focused on their investment e¤ects
between high-tax countries, see Chisik and Davies (2004).
7This competition model became a workhorse model in Industrial Organization. In the
tax competition literature, this framework has been used by Wang (2004), Andersson and
Konrad (2001), Konrad and Kovenock (2009) and Marceau et al. (2010).
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such as strategic trade policy, outsourcing, and other policy areas are Dixit (1984),
Horn and Levinsohn (2001), Lommerud et al. (2006) and Norbäck et al. (2009). In
our framework the change in market concentration is caused by one player who is
not a tax haven itself, but governs the possible exit or deactivation of some of the tax
havens that compete among themselves, rather than by a merger. This di¤erence is
discussed in more detail in Section 2.6.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 develops the model framework.
In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 we solve for the equilibria of the multi-stage game. Sec-
tion 2.5 discusses and compares the di¤erent deactivation regimes, their results and
implications. Section 2.6 discusses the robustness of the results, in particular with
respect to more than two tax havens and provides a numerical example. Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 The structure of the problem
We consider a multi-stage game with three players: One player is the government
in the country or group of countries that engage in ghting tax havens (or, for that
purpose, the OECD).8 We call this player S. Residents in S are the sole owners of
nancial capital. The other two players are tax havens, denoted H1 and H2: which
seek to attract mobile capital by o¤ering concealment services. Depending on the
tax rate on capital income in S, whether the tax havens are active, and the terms
which the tax havens o¤er for their services, nancial capital can allocate between
S;H1 and H2. Our analysis generalizes for more than two tax havens, as is shown in
Section 2.6.
8There is a free-riding problem among the OECD countries. We disregard this problem
in order to concentrate on the market e¤ect. In some sense and particularly with regard
to the ght against tax havens, the OECD is the institution that coordinates its members
on a common anti-tax-haven policy.
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In Phase 1 - the haven deactivation phase - actions by S, H1 and H2 determine
whether no, one or two tax havens will be available for investors. Country S may o¤er
to compensate the tax haven in exchange for its promise to enter into full information
exchange and e¤ectively discontinue its tax haven business. The assumption by which
S compensates the tax havens to terminate their operation rather than threatening
them with retaliatory actions, which are costly for the country that carries them out,
is mainly for analytical simplicity and clarity.9 We distinguish between two di¤erent
types of o¤ers made. One of these types is seen as a possible option that is currently
not pursued. The other type maps more closely the current OECD initiative.
Simultaneous joint o¤er : Country S o¤ers payments b1  0 and b2  0 to the
two tax havens H1 and H2, respectively. S is able to commit to either pay both
amounts or none, and to make this payment dependent on whether or not both
havens agree. Tax havens then simultaneously and independently declare whether
they would be willing to accept this o¤er or not. Each tax haven commits to close
down in exchange for receiving the payment, but continues to operate if no payment
is received. Accordingly, if both agree, then S makes both payments. If payments are
made, both tax havens go out of business. If only one tax haven declares agreement
or if none of the tax havens declares agreement, then no money is paid out and both
tax havens remain active, and we move to Phase 2 of the game with two active tax
havens.
Sequential o¤ers: Country S may rst o¤er a payment bi to one of the tax havens
Hi. This tax haven has to decide whether to accept this o¤er and to become inactive
in Phase 2, or to remain active. Based on this observed outcome country S may (but
need not) o¤er a payment b i to the other tax haven, H i. The choice of making
9An approach not using a "carrot" but a "stick" would yield results with a similar
avour. A punishment threat to a haven is costly for S as well, and causes a di¤erential in
payo¤ for the tax haven between compliance and non-compliance plus punishment. Unlike
for the simple compensation that we consider, however, the cost and this di¤erential need
not be of equal size.
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this o¤er, and the payment chosen, typically will depend on the outcome of the rst
o¤er made, and on whether it has been accepted or not. Also, whether the tax haven
H i accepts or rejects this o¤er can generally be dependent on the rst o¤er made
and whether it has been accepted or not.
We assume that the havens accept the o¤er if they are indi¤erent between ac-
cepting or rejecting. This ends Phase 1.10
At the beginning of Phase 2 -the competition phase- the set of active tax havens
is either fH1; H2g, fH1g, fH2g or ?. S rst chooses a tax rate t that applies to
nancial capital invested in country S. This tax rate is from a closed interval [0; r],
where r may, for instance, be as large as a fully conscatory rate of 100 percent. We
consider the upper end of this interval as exogenously given here, but it could also
be endogenized, together with making the total capital stock react to the anticipated
tax rate. An option of "free disposal" of capital, for instance, would practically limit
t to a maximum of 100 percent.11 This tax has to be paid by each unit of nancial
capital that will locate in S. Tax havens that are active (that is, tax havens that
have not accepted or received an o¤er by S in Phase 1) observe t and then choose
user fees p1 2 [0; r] and p2 2 [0; r] per unit of nancial capital that will be invested in
the respective tax haven. In exchange for the fee the haven guarantees the investor
full secrecy as regards his or her capital.12 We assume that investors can fully rely
10We follow here a tradition which is common in the theory analysis of principal-agent
problems and consider simple take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. Note that this makes the envi-
ronment as favorable as possible for the OECD. Note also that more complex, possibly
repeated concepts of non-cooperative Nash bargaining with complete and perfect informa-
tion typically boil down to immediate agreement (Rubinstein 1982).
11From an analytic point of view, an upper limit of r is a necessary complement to the
supply of capital being xed exogenously here. The latter is a standard assumption in
the tax competition literature, but is obviously a partial analytic simplication. For this
assumption and a discussion of it, including further references, see Bucovetsky (2009).
12The government need not charge these fees directly to capital owners but may charge
these fees to the local nancial sector in the tax haven. If this sector faces perfect com-
petition inside each tax haven and has only foreign customers, the fees chosen by the
14
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Phase 1: Haven Deactivation Phase 2: Tax competition
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Figure 2.1: The upper panel and the lower panel show the structures of the game for
the sequential and the simultaneous joint o¤er deactivation regime, respectively. The gray
squares on the right-hand side represent the tax competition continuation games that may
emerge from the deactivation phases.
on this promise. Hence, investors save the residence income tax t on this capital
income. The partially sequential nature of this competition with S as a Stackelberg
leader follows the consideration that tax havens are quicker and more exible in their
choices of fees than is the parliamentary process of tax legislation in the OECD. The
two phases for the simultaneous o¤er regime and for the sequential o¤er regime are
mapped in Figure 2.1.
Once the conditions for investment are known, nancial capital is allocated be-
tween S; H1 and H2 as a function of the tax t and the user fees pi for i 2 f1; 2g in
government and imposed on the local banking sector are fully passed through to their cus-
tomers, just as if they would be charged to the capital owners directly. Perfect competition
in the nancial sector and the absence of local resident customers also removes possible
considerations of strategic trade policy from the picture that would be relevant otherwise.
With oligopoly in the nancial sector and/or with local residents as customers, deactivating
single tax havens would inuence the incentives for strategic policy along lines that have
been drawn in a more general setup by Krishna and Thursby (1991).
15
Chapter 2. Fighting Multiple Tax Havens
the active tax havens. The total amount of nancial capital is normalized to 1, and
is owned by residents of country S.13 There are three di¤erent types of nancial cap-
ital. A share s of this nancial capital is fully immobile. This is the share of capital
owned by residents who cannot, or would never like to invest their nancial capital
o¤shore and simply pay whatever is the tax rate in country S. Shares hi of capital
are mobile only between S and one of the respective tax haven Hi for i 2 f1; 2g.
For our analysis we assume h1 > h2 > 0; i.e., we allow for havens to have di¤erent
market positions.14 The share hi of nancial capital is invested in Hi if and only if
pi  t.15 This assumption corresponds to the notion that some investors may have
an a¢ nity for particular tax haven countries. This a¢ nity could, for instance, be
based on geographical proximity, language, a convenient legal code etc. Finally, there
is a remaining amount of nancial capital that is perfectly mobile. This amount is
denoted by  = 1   s   h1   h2. The share  stays in S if t is smaller than pi for
all tax havens that are active. It moves to a tax haven rather than staying in S if
the user fee in one of the active tax havens is at least as low as the tax. If both tax
havens are active and the user fees in both tax havens are not higher than t, this
capital locates in the tax haven with the lower user fee, and if both tax havens are
active and p1 = p2  t, equal shares of this fully mobile capital locate in each of
the two tax havens.16 Capital yields the same gross return, independent of where it
is located (which is a natural assumption in case of a well integrated international
capital market). And it does not restrict generality if we normalize this return to
13Here tax havens do not have a genuine business other than sheltering foreign nancial
assets from resident taxes in their respective home countries. Hines (2010) provides empir-
ical evidence about tax havens, showing that the overwhelming share of these indeed has
a tiny national GDP. Our assumption is also appropriate if the tax havens have resident
capital income, but can treat their own residents di¤erently from foreign investors.
14The case hi = 0 can be obtained for considering limhi ! 0, but keeping hi > 0
simplies the formal exposition.
15For pi = t this is the natural tie-breaking assumption, given that S chooses t prior to
the tax havenschoices of fees.
16Like in the workhorse model of tax competition, mobile capital simply ows to where
the net return is highest.
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zero, i.e., assume that one unit of nancial investment turns into one unit of gross
nancial return, and -as is common in the tax competition literature- consider taxes
and fees on capital, rather than on its returns.
The payo¤s of S, H1 and H2 are as follows. Each tax haven maximizes the sum
of user fees and payments bi received from S. An active tax haven does not receive
any payment from S and its payo¤ equals its user fees, which is equal to the product
of pi and the amount of nancial capital xi that is invested in this tax haven, where
xi is a function of t and pi, and of whether the other tax haven is active. This is
considered in more detail further below. The benevolent government in country S
maximizes the following payo¤:
S = (1  t)(1  x1   x2) + (1  p1)x1 + (1  p2)x2 (2.1)
+(1 + )t(1  x1   x2)  (1 + )(1b1 + 2b2)
The payo¤ (2.1) consists of several terms. The rst term in (2.1) is the net-of-tax
return on domestically invested capital. The second and third terms represent the
capital incomes of residents net of user fees p1x1 and p2x2 paid on the amounts x1
and x2 that result from the nancial assets shifted o¤shore to H1 and H2. The fourth
term is the social valuation of the capital tax revenue. This is equal to the product
of (1 + ) and the tax revenue. The tax revenue is equal to t times the amount of
nancial capital that locates to S. The factor (1 + ) accounts for the fact that
government revenue has a shadow price of public funds (1 + ). This shadow price
is equal to the marginal social cost of an additional unit of tax revenue from other
(distortionary) sources of taxation, measured in units of private consumption. A
positive  is the basis of the theory of optimal taxation, as these theories are based
on the plausible assumption that the collection of tax revenue for nancing desirable
public expenditure generally causes an excess burden of taxation. And to assume
that (1 + ) is constant is generally justied as an approximation for the case in
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which the capital income tax is a small share of the total tax revenue generated in
country S.17 The last term is the social cost of possible payments b1 and b2 that
are o¤ered to the tax havens. These depend on whether the tax havens accept these
payments (for becoming inactive). Here, 1 and 1 are indicator variables that are
equal to 1 and 0 , depending on whether or not the payments are accepted and made.
To solve the di¤erent variants of this game we use the concept of subgame perfect
equilibrium. We start with solving for the set of equilibria in phase 2 for di¤erent
combinations of active tax havens.
2.3 Equilibrium in Phase 2
If both tax havens are active Country S chooses t prior to the tax havens
choices of p1 and p2. Consider the payo¤ of Hi for a given t and pj:
Hi = pixi =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if pi > t
pihi + pi if pi < p i  t
pihi +
1
2
pi if pi = p i  t
pihi if t  pi > p i
(2.2)
for i; i 2 f1; 2g. A choice of pi > t will render the haven zero prots. For pi  t, if
Hi o¤ers lower user fees pi than its haven competitor, it attracts its partially mobile
capital segment hi and the price sensitive segment . If it o¤ers its services for a fee
pi that is higher than its haven competitor, then it attracts only its partially mobile
capital segment. If the two havens set the same level of user fees, then each gets
17For the assumption of constant (1+) > 1 and its discussion see Bucovetsky (2009) in
the tax competition context, and La¤ont and Tirole (1986) in the context of procurement
and regulation. Our justication for the assumption is the same as theirs, which is outlined
in more detail by Caillaud et al.(1988).
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its partially mobile segment, while the price sensitive  segment is equally divided
between the two havens.
The range of possible equilibrium choices of fees by the tax havens can be nar-
rowed down. By (2.2) a choice pi > t for t > 0 yields zero payo¤ and is payo¤-
dominated by an appropriate choice pi 2 (0; t). Also, a haven will never set a price
which is lower than
p^i =
thi
hi + 
, (2.3)
as such low prices are payo¤-dominated by a choice pi = t that yields a payo¤ that
is higher or equal to thi, irrespective of the other tax havens choice. The maximum
payo¤ obtainable from a pi < t is pi (hi + ) and this maximum is obtained if,
choosing this pi, haven Hi captures the whole price-sensitive mobile segment . Note
further that p^1 > p^2 as h1 > h2 . Given that p1  p^1, this implies that p2 < p^1 is
payo¤-dominated by a price p2 closer to p^1. This narrows down the range of possible
price chosen in an equilibrium to the interval [p^1; t]. Note further that, for any given
t 2 (0; r], there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.18 Intuitively, haven Hi
has an incentive to undercut haven H is user fee by a very small amount in regions
in which prices are above the oor p^1, as this lures the whole mobile segment  to
Hi. And p1 = p2 = p^1 is also not an equilibrium, as, from there, deviations towards
pi = t pay for at least one player.
The competition between tax havens, for a given t; is structurally equivalent
to Bertrand competition between two rms with loyal customers as in Narasimhan
18To conrm this, suppose that (p1; p2) 2 [p^1; r] [p^1; r] is such an equilibrium. Note
that p1 and p2 cannot be mutually optimal replies if p1 > p^1 and p2 > p^1. Suppose
they are, and let pi  p i. Then H i could increase its payo¤ by moving to pi    for
su¢ ciently small but positive . Note next that p1 and p2 cannot be mutually optimal
replies if minfp1; p2g = p^1. Two cases need to be distinguished. If p1 = p2 = p^1 then H1
can do better by choosing p1 = r. If pi > p

 i = p^1, then H i can do better by increasing
its price by half the di¤erence between pi and p

 i. This shows that the claim of existence
of a pure strategy equilibrium leads to a contradiction.
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(1988), and we can use his results on existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium and
its characterization.19 A unique equilibrium exists and is in mixed strategies. In this
equilibrium each haven picks its price independently and randomly according to a
cumulative distribution function Fi for i = (1; 2) with support [p^1; t]; with haven H1
having a mass point at t. The following lemma describes the havenspayo¤s in this
equilibrium.20
Lemma 2.1 (Narasimhan (1988)) For t > 0 there exists a unique equilibrium of the
subgame between two active havens.21 The equilibrium has the expected payo¤s
E(1) = h1t for H1 and E(2) =
h1t
h1 + 
(h2 + ) for H2. (2.4)
In (2.4) H1 with the larger partially mobile segment earns the same prot that it
would earn if it were to set p1 = t with probability 1. The haven H2 with the smaller
hi segment earns h1t (h2 + ) = (h1 + ) which is higher than the prot h2t that H2
could make if it only focused on its partially mobile segment of capital. Hence, this
tax havens prot is positive even if it has no own partially mobile capital segment,
i.e., if limh2 ! 0.
The competition framework used here has several advantages. It is su¢ ciently
general to have many standard cases as special cases. Suppose, for instance, that
19A generalization to n competitors is by Baye et al. (1992) for symmetric rms and by
Kocas and Kiyak (2006) for asymmetric rms. We use their results to consider the case
with more than two tax havens in Section 1.6.
20Equilibrium in mixed strategies for the choice of tax rates in tax competition has
been used in number of recent papers, including Marceau et al. (2010), Wang (2004), and
Konrad and Kovenock (2009). In our context only the tax havens use mixed strategies
as regards the choice of fees, which are more like administratively chosen prices than law-
based tax rates. Accordingly, the choice of such fees is similar to the choice of prices as
in the standard literature that follows the tradition of Varian (1980) and the justication
used for mixed strategies in this broad literature applies also here.
21For completeness we report the cumulative distribution functions characterizing the
equilibrium. These are F1(p) = F2(p) = 0 for p < h1t=(h1t + ); F1 = 1 + h2   h1t(h2+)p(h1+)
and F2 = 1  h1(t p)p for h1th1t+  p  t and F1 = F2 = 1 for p > t.
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h1 = h2  h. Then the equilibrium is symmetric. Both tax havens would earn the
same expected payo¤ th. For limh! 0 this payo¤ becomes equal to zero, as this is
the case of Bertrand competition for a perfectly homogenous product and without
loyal customers. Also, if the fully price-sensitive share  converges towards zero, then
both tax havens simply charge the monopoly price as the pure equilibrium strategy.
Furthermore, the payo¤s in the competition subgame are uniquely determined in
the equilibrium (Narasimhan (1988)). This allows us to consider a contracted game
in which we can replace the subgame by the unique equilibrium payo¤s of this last
stage.
Assuming subgame perfect equilibrium play and using Lemma 2. 1, the payo¤ of
country S is
1  ts  h1t  h1t
h1 + 
(h2 + ) + (1 + ) ts. (2.5)
For any t > 0 one or both of the tax havens can attract the mobile tax base. Hence,
the welfare of country S consists of investorsexpected net returns plus (1+) times
the tax revenue, minus (1+) times the payments for closing down tax havens (zero
in this case, as both tax havens are active). The immobile capital (quantity s) stays
in country S. All other capital is invested in the equilibrium in one or the other tax
haven for t 2 (0; r]. The expected fees collected by the tax havens are equal to their
expected payo¤s, and are generally a function of t. Country S maximizes (2.5) with
respect to t.
The two tax havens choose their equilibrium fees simultaneously once t is chosen
and observed. Intuitively, for t > 0, they can always undercut S and attract all of the
price-sensitive mobile capital. Country S, hence, anticipates that, for any t > 0, only
the immobile capital remains in S, and this immobile tax base remains una¤ected by
changes in p1 and p2: Consequently, it is the shadow price of public funds,  which
determines whether the government is willing to set the tax rate equal to 0 or to the
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maximum rate. The threshold value for the shadow price will be shown to be
^ = [1 +
h2 + 
h1 + 
](h1=s). (2.6)
This threshold value ^ depends on the mobility composition of the nancial capital.
In particular, taking partial derivatives of (2.6) shows that an increase in any of the
mobile capital segments results in an increase in ^, while an increase in s decreases
the size of the critical shadow price of public funds. Of course, none of h1, h2 ,  or s
can change in isolation, as they are connected through the budget constraint. More
formally, we can state:
Proposition 2.1 (i) Let  > ^. In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the contin-
uation game with two active tax havens, S chooses t = r. The expected equilibrium
prots of the tax havens and of S are :
E(1) = h1r and
E(2) = [h2 + ]
h1r
h1+
and
E(S) = 1 + rs  h1r   h1rh1+ (h2 + )
(2.7)
(ii) Let  < ^. Then the subgame perfect equilibrium of the continuation game with
two active tax havens is described by t = 0, E(1) = E(2) = 0 and E(S) = 1.
Proof. Consider Ss optimal choice t from the interval [0; r] of feasible tax rates,
anticipating equilibrium play in the continuation game for any given choice of t. The
countrys objective is to maximize (2.5). The gradient of the expression in (2.5) with
respect to t is
@E(S)
@t
= s  h1   h1
h1 + 
(h2 + ) , (2.8)
and is independent of t. (i) The gradient is positive if  >
h
1 + h2+
h1+
i
h1
s
 ^. The
payo¤ of S is maximal for the maximum feasible t which is t = r. The equilibrium
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payo¤s in (2.7) follow from t = r, Lemma 2.1 and from inserting t = r into the payo¤
function (2.5) for S. (ii) Note that (2.8) is independent of t and negative if  < ^.
For  smaller than this threshold, the optimal choice of the tax rate is, therefore, the
smallest possible tax rate, t = 0. In this case any possible choice of p1 and p2 yields
the same payo¤s (of zero) for both tax havens, and S = 1 by (2.5). Note also that
there is a multiplicity of (payo¤-equivalent) equilibria with t = 0: all pi and pj yield
the same payo¤s.
If only one tax haven Hi is active. Consider the possible options for nancial
capital if only one tax haven Hi is active. For the capital hi that either locates in the
active tax haven Hi or in S, and for the immobile capital segment s the investment
options do not change. The price-sensitive capital segment  can now locate only in
S or in Hi. The capital share hj that was mobile only between S and Hj; which is
now inactive, becomes immobile: As Hj is no longer active, hj remains in S:
As Hj but not Hi is deactivated, a payment bj has been made, and no payment
has been made to Hi. Hence, j = 1 and i = 0 hold. Note that, in the following
section, the newly added superscripts to the payo¤ function refer to the haven which
has been deactivated. To di¤erentiate between the possible regimes, we use the
following notation for the payo¤ of S: kS denotes the payo¤ of S as a function of the
regime, where superscript k = 0 refers to the default state regime (both tax havens
active), k = 1, k = 2 and k = 1; 2 refer to the regimes with i = 1 or i = 2 or i = 1
and i = 2 deactivated.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose that Hj has been deactivated due to a payment bj. (i) If
 > (hi + )=(s + hj) then the subgame perfect equilibrium in Phase 2 is unique in
payo¤s and characterized by pi = t = r with payo¤s:
ji = (hi + )r; 
j
j = bj and
jS = 1 + (s+ hj)r   (hi + )r   (1 + )bj:
(2.9)
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(ii) If  < (hi + )=(s + hj) then the subgame perfect equilibrium in Phase 2 is
unique and characterized by pi = t = 0, with payo¤s 
j
S = 1  (1 + )bj, ji = 0 and
jj = bj.
(iii) For  = (hi + )=(s+ hj) both equilibria exist.
Proof. Using backward induction, consider the last stage. The only active tax haven
Hi chooses pi for given t 2 [0; r] to maximize His payo¤ pixi, with xi = 0 if pi > t
and xi = 1  s  hj if pi 2 [0; t]. The solution of this maximization problem is pi = t
for all t  0 and yields a payo¤ of (1  s hj)t = (+hi)t. For t > 0, the optimal pi
is unique. For t = 0; all possible pi yield the same payo¤ of zero. Turn next to the
optimal choice of t and take into consideration that at this stage bj is exogenously
given and that pi = t in the continuation game for t > 0. Country S maximizes
1  (s+ hj) t  (hi + ) t+ (1 + ) ((s+ hj) t  bj) (2.10)
The gradient of this payo¤with respect to t is  (s+ hj) (hi + )+(1+)(s+hj) and
independent of t. Accordingly, the optimal choice is a corner solution. S chooses t = r
(i.e., the largest feasible tax rate) if (s+hj) > hi+ and t = 0 if (s+hj) < hi+
which reduces to the condition for  in the proposition. Finally, for (s+hj) = hi+
both t = r (with the respective equilibrium of the subgame as in (i)) and t = 0 (with
the respective equilibrium as in (ii)) yield the same payo¤ for S and this payo¤ is
higher than from any choice t 2 (0; r).
Intuitively, given the sequential structure of the tax decision, the fully mobile
capital will always leave S for any t > 0. And for t = 0, whether the capital locates
to S or H1 (with p1 = 0) is payo¤-irrelevant. Due to the lack of competition for
the mobile capital segment, the active tax haven earns the monopoly prot from
the entire share of nancial capital that is mobile between S and Hi. It chooses
pi = t as this ensures maximum prot for the tax haven Hi which is active. With
Ss choice of t not a¤ecting the nal destination of the mobile capital segment, S
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chooses t = r only if  is su¢ ciently high. The condition for  to be su¢ ciently high
is also intuitive. A high tax is more benecial for the country if its equilibrium tax
base is large (i.e., s + hj is large), and if (hi + ), which is the base on which the
country as a whole loses the fees to the tax haven, is small.
If none of the tax havens is active. Suppose S has deactivated both havens and
nancial capital can only remain in S: Accordingly, all capital remains in country S,
the country has to pay b1 and b2, and can charge any tax rate t 2 [0; r]. The payo¤
function of S becomes 1 t+(1 + ) (t  b1   b2) and this payo¤ reaches a maximum
equal to 1 + r   (1 + )(b1 + b2) for t = r. Hence:
Proposition 2.3 If both tax havens are deactivated, then S chooses t = r and has
a payo¤ 1;2s = 1+ r  (1 + )(b1 + b2): The payo¤s of the tax havens are 1;21 = b1
and 1;22 = b2.
2.4 Equilibrium in Phase 1
In what follows we focus on the case in which the shadow price of public funds is
su¢ ciently high to make a high tax strategy always preferable for S. We rst show
that S cannot expect to gain from deactivating just one tax haven, assuming sub-
game perfect equilibrium play in Phase 2. We then consider the cost and benet of
deactivating both tax havens for the sequential regime and the regime with simulta-
neous joint o¤ers. This comparison leads to our main results: An equilibrium with
simultaneous joint o¤ers exists, whereas sequential o¤ers are never protable for S.
2.4.1 Deactivation of only one tax haven
For the active haven, deactivation of only one tax haven yields an increase in prots
for the only remaining active tax haven for any given t > 0, due to reduced competi-
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tion. If only H1 remains active, an optimal reply for any given t 2 (0; r] is p1 = t and
its payo¤ is (h1 + )t. Compared to both havens being active, the payo¤ increase is
t. If only H2 remains active, its payo¤ is (h2+)t . Compared to both havens being
active, the payo¤ increases by (h2 + )t=(h1 + ). Intuitively, a larger h1 makes
haven H1 less aggressive in the competition. Hence, there is little to gain for H2 from
removing its competitor H1 if h1 is large. Note also that monopoly prots for a tax
haven need not be larger than the aggregate prots in the case where both havens
are active. Deactivation of a tax haven Hi shifts the share hi of capital away from
that tax haven. However, removal of competition between tax havens also increases
equilibrium user fees in the remaining tax haven which increases the payo¤ of the
active haven.
For S, deactivating one tax haven has several e¤ects. First, if Hi is deactivated
and H i remains active, the level of gross capital remaining in S and being taxed
with t = r increases from s to s + hi. This increases the tax revenue in S. Second,
there is a reduction in investorsrents. This is due to higher user fees that are charged
on the mobile capital if only one tax haven is active, compared to a situation with
several competing tax havens. Hence, with only one tax haven active, all capital
(inside and outside S) is charged at the same, high rate r. Third, compared to both
tax havens being active, S has to pay for the deactivation of one tax haven which
reduces the payo¤ of country S.
We now conrm that the deactivation of only one tax haven is dominated by
other choices for country S. We state this claim as a proposition.
Proposition 2.4 Country S has a higher payo¤ if both tax havens are active than
if it deactivates exactly one haven.
Proof. Note that the e¤ects of the deactivation of Hi on the payo¤ of S di¤er for
i 2 f1; 2g if h1 6= h2. Deactivating Hi only increases Ss payo¤ if
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iS = (1  r) (s+ hi) + (h i + )  r (h i + )| {z }
active havens prots| {z }
net capital income
+ (1 + )[r(s+ hi)  bi]| {z }
net tax revenue
> 1  rs 

h1r +
h1
(h1 + )
r (h2 + )

| {z }
aggregate havens prots| {z }
net capital income
+ (1 + ) rs|{z}
net tax revenue
= 0S (2.11)
Rearranging (2.11) yields the sole haven deactivation condition (SHIC):
(1 + ) [rhi   bi]| {z }
shadow value * increase in net tax revenue
  
(h1 + )
r (h2 + )| {z }
decrease in net capital income
 0 (2.12)
The condition (2.12) shows: for the deactivation of one tax haven to be protable for
S, the decrease in net capital income has to be compensated by an increase in net tax
revenue. As 
(h1+)
r (h2 + ) and  are always positive, the level of compensation of-
fered and paid to the deactivated haven plays an important role in this condition. The
minimum possible compensation, which just compensates the tax haven for its loss in
prots, as in Lemma 2.1 for t = r can be inserted for bi which transforms (SHIC) into
  
(h1+)
r (h2 + )  0 when deactivating H1
(1 + )

rh2   h1
(h1 + )
r (h2 + )

| {z }
<0
  
(h1+)
r (h2 + )  0 when deactivating H2:
Thus, the condition SHIC cannot be fullled.
Intuitively, deactivating one tax haven does not change total gross capital income
here, but changes its decomposition in private income, tax revenue for S, and fees
and compensation payments for the tax havens. Fees for the tax haven that remains
active go up, due to the reduction in competition pressure between tax havens. This
e¤ect is the main driver of the result, as this e¤ect in isolation reduces welfare in S.
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A secondary e¤ect is that tax revenue in S goes up. However, in order to achieve
this, S needs to compensate the deactivated tax haven for its loss in fees and has to
use public funds for this. For instance, if S deactivates the larger tax haven H1, then
the compensation for the loss in H1s fees is just equal to the additional tax revenue
in S. And, as this compensation is paid with public funds, the shadow price of this
payment is higher than the money value taken from the capital owners in terms of
fees.
2.4.2 Deactivation of all tax havens
The result in Proposition 2.4 reduces the problem to possible equilibria with de-
activation of both, or none of the tax havens. We turn to this comparison now.
Again, the problem is whether or not the compensations required are su¢ ciently low
for making the deactivation of both tax havens attractive for S. We rst derive a
condition describing the maximum that S is willing to pay.
Proposition 2.5 The country S is better-o¤ than in the default state if it deactivates
both tax havens provided that the sum of compensations fullls the condition
b1 + b2 < rh1 +
h1
(h1 + )
(h2 + ) r +

(1 + )

(h1 + )
(h2 + ) r. (2.13)
Proof. Country S makes deactivation o¤ers only if its payo¤ 1;2S after deactivation
is at least as high as payo¤ 0S. This condition can be written explicitly as
1;2S = 1  r + (1 + ) [r   b1   b2] (2.14)
> 1  rs  h1r   h1
(h1 + )
r (h2 + ) + (1 + ) rs = 
0
S
Rearranging yields:

(h1 + )
r (h2 + )| {z }
decrease in net capital income
 (1 + ) [r (h1 + h2 + )  b1   b2]| {z }
increase in net tax revenue
(2.15)
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This can be solved for b1 and b2 and yields (2.13).
Intuitively, deactivation of both tax havens has three main e¤ects. First, it in-
creases gross tax revenue in S; as all capital is taxed in S now, rather than invested
in tax havens. Second, it reduces private capital income net of taxes, as in the equi-
librium with two competing active tax havens, the fees on capital in the tax havens
were, on average, lower than the equilibrium tax rate in S. Third, if deactivated, tax
havens lose their income from fees, and country S uses public funds to pay them for
this. The deactivation is benecial for S if what needs to be paid to the tax havens
for their deactivation is su¢ ciently small (see condition (2.13)).
A comparison of (2.7) and (2.13) shows that, for  = 0, the maximum sum of
bids that makes deactivation benecial for S is equal to the equilibrium tax revenues
of the two tax havens they have in the equilibrium if they stay active. The condition
also highlights the role of the shadow price of public funds. Deactivation of the
tax havens converts some private income of capital owners in country S into public
funds. Hence, if  > 0, then the willingness to pay of S for a deactivation is higher,
as suggested by the third term on the right-hand side of (2.13).
2.5 Deactivation equilibrium
We have now shown that it is never an equilibrium for S to deactivate just one tax
haven. Further, Proposition 2.5 characterizes Ss maximum willingness to pay in
order to deactivate both tax havens. The compensation that is needed in order to
induce the two tax havens to close down is, however, a function of the deactivation
regime. We show in this section that the compensation that would be needed with
simultaneous joint o¤ers for the deactivation of the tax havens is small enough,
whereas the compensation that would be needed in total to deactivate both tax
havens exceeds the willingness of S to pay in the sequential o¤er regime.
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2.5.1 Simultaneous joint o¤ers
First we consider a deactivation process in which S makes a simultaneous joint o¤er
(b1; b2) to the two tax havens. The following result holds:
Proposition 2.6 If S can make a simultaneous joint o¤er (b1; b2), then a subgame
perfect equilibrium exists in which both tax havens become deactivated, with payo¤s
1;21 = b1 = h1r (2.16)
1;22 = b2 =
h1
(h1 + )
r (h2 + ) (2.17)
and
1;2S = 1  r + (1 + )

rs+

(h1 + )
r (h2 + )

. (2.18)
Proof. This regimes distinctive feature lies in the conditionality of the o¤ers on
the actions of the other haven, as each haven only receives a compensation when
both accept the o¤ers. Suppose S makes a simultaneous joint o¤er (b1; b2). Figure
2.2 summarizes the payo¤s for the four subgames, assuming equilibrium play in the
respective subgames that are reached, depending on the decision of the havens to
either accept or reject the o¤er of S.
Haven 2
Haven 1 Accept Reject
Accept b1; b2 h1r; h1h1+ r (h2 + )
Reject h1r; h1h1+ r (h2 + ) h1r;
h1
h1+
r (h2 + )
Figure 2.2: Payo¤ matrix for the case of simultaneous joint o¤ers
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Figure 2.2 uses t = r and the expected payo¤s stated in Lemma 2.1 for the
competition phase subgame with both tax havens being active. In each of the four
cases, the rst entry corresponds to the payo¤ of H1 and the second to the payo¤ of
H2. The tax havens receive b1 and b2, respectively, if both accept the o¤er, and they
receive the payo¤s of the subgame with two active havens if one or both of them
reject the o¤er. Joint acceptance is, hence, an equilibrium choice if bi  E(0i ) for
both i = 1; 2. Moreover, the smallest amounts b1 and b2 for which joint acceptances
are optimal mutual replies by the tax havens are bi = E(0i ) for both i = 1; 2.
These bids fulll conditions (2.16) and (2.17) in Proposition 2.6 and, together with
the deactivation of both havens, yield (2.18). This payo¤ 1;2S exceeds 
0
S, as can
be seen from comparing E(S) in (2.7) and (2.18). (The comparison boils down to
(h1++)
(h1+)
> 1 which is true.)
Proposition 2.6 shows that S can protably deactivate all tax havens, provided
that it can make a simultaneous joint o¤er to all tax havens. Intuitively, if S can
make a simultaneous joint o¤er, the tax havens understand that they will never
become the only active tax haven. Either both give up their tax haven business, or
both stay active. Accordingly, it is optimal for them if they both accept the o¤er
provided that the o¤er is at least as attractive for them as the situation in which
both compete with each other, but they should reject any lower o¤er.
Note that the equilibrium in Proposition 2.6 is not unique, due to the coordi-
nation problem between the two tax havens. The simultaneous joint o¤ers lead to
payments and deactivation of both tax havens only if both tax havens accept the
o¤er. Consider, for instance, o¤ers (b1; b2) equal to, or even higher than (2.16) and
(2.17). Although it would be benecial for H1 and H2 to accept the o¤ers, there
is also an equilibrium in which both reject the o¤ers: Given the expectation that
the other tax haven H i will reject the o¤er, rejecting the o¤er is an optimal re-
ply for Hi. Further, this coordination problem could be used by the tax havens to
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leverage up their equilibrium payo¤s. For instance, if S expects the tax havens to
end up in this rejection equilibrium for all o¤ers (b1; b2) with b1 < h1r +  and
b2 <
h1
h1+
r (h2 + ) + , but with both accepting the o¤ers for b1  h1r +  and
b2  h1h1+ r (h2 + ) + ; this can support equilibria in which country S has to pay
an additional 2 for positive and su¢ ciently low , compared to the minimum of-
fers that are accepted in the equilibrium in Proposition 2.6. These equilibria which
are based on coordination failure are, however, not robust. They rely on Hi being
indi¤erent regarding whether to accept or to reject if Hi thinks that Hj will reject.
Country S can break this indi¤erence if it can o¤er a menu that o¤ers Hi also a very
small payment for the case in which Hi accepts but Hj rejects the o¤er.
2.5.2 Independent sequential o¤ers
Consider now the sequential deactivation regime, where S rst approaches one haven
Hi with a bid bi for deactivation and then can make a bid bj to the other tax haven
Hj. The sequential process allows S to adjust its bid to Hj taking into consideration
whether the previous bid to Hi was accepted or not.
Proposition 2.7 If S makes sequential independent o¤ers, the sum of compensa-
tions needed to deactivate both tax havens is smaller if the tax haven with more loyal
capital (with higher hi) is compensated rst. Overall, the combination of (bi; bj(:))
that would make both havens accept the o¤ers exceeds country Ss willingness to pay.
Proof. Using backward induction, we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of this
o¤er regime. Assume that S rst makes an o¤er bi to Hi, and then, depending on
the outcome, possibly an o¤er bj(:) to Hj. Note that no o¤er bj is made if bi was not
accepted, as this would lead to the deactivation of one tax haven only, and it was
shown in Proposition 2.4 that it is not protable for S to deactivate only one haven.
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Suppose therefore that Hi has accepted the o¤er bi, and consider the behavior of Hj
for a given bj(:), given that Hi is deactivated. Given that Hj is the only haven that
is possibly active, the o¤er is acceptable for Hj if and only if bj(:)  (hj + )r. If S
makes such an o¤er, it chooses the smallest acceptable o¤er, bj(:) = (hj + )r.
Turn now to the compensation o¤er bi. As a consequence of Proposition 2.4, Hi
anticipates that S will never o¤er a deactivation bid to Hj if Hi rejects the o¤er bi.
Thus, the optimal strategy of Hi is to reject the o¤er if bi < 0i and to accept it if
bi  0i . Accordingly, S will either deactivate Hi by a bid bi = 0i or not make an
o¤er to Hi and pay nothing.
The lowest feasible sum of bids that deactivates both tax havens, hence, is bi +
bj(:) = 
0
i + 
i
j. Country S makes these sequential o¤ers if the sum of these o¤ers
fullls inequality (2.13) in Proposition 2.5.
Before we check whether (2.13) can be fullled for successful sequential o¤ers,
note that 01 + 
1
2  02 + 21. This can be seen by inserting 12 = (h2r + r), 21
= (h1r + r) and 01 and 
0
2 for t = r as in Lemma 2.1 into this inequality which
becomes equivalent to the condition h1  h2. Accordingly, if S makes an o¤er in the
sequential o¤er regime, the rst o¤er is made to tax haven H1.
For these sequential o¤ers to be benecial for S, the sum of o¤ers b1 + b2 =
h1r+h2r+r needs to be no greater than the right-hand side of (2.13) in Proposition
2.5. Inserting and reorganizing leads to the condition
1  1  
(h1 + ) (1 + )
, (2.19)
and this condition can never be fullled for  > 0.
Intuitively, the sequential procedure has a major problem: once the rst tax
haven has been deactivated, this benets the tax haven that remains active. This
haven has a larger payo¤ than if both tax havens are active and compete, since
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it has lost its main competitor. Country S therefore would have to pay a high
price for deactivating the remaining tax haven monopoly. This competition e¤ect
emerges only in the sequential regime, and is the main reason why the sequential
regime is so unattractive. The result provides a potentially important lesson for the
ongoing process by which the OECD tries to close down one tax haven after another.
While initially the closing down of the rst few tax havens is not very expensive,
compensating further tax havens to close down their operation becomes increasingly
costly: due to the reduced competition, the tax havensbusiness becomes more and
more protable, and this increases the compensation needed.
If -for whatever reason- the OECD initiative has to follow a sequential path,
Proposition 2.7 also highlights an important second-best result: it is superior to start
this sequential process by making an o¤er to the strongest tax haven(s) rst (i.e.,
the one with the largest hi) and then move on to the smaller tax havens later. This
is also not necessarily in line with observed behavior in the Harmful Tax Practices
Initiative.
2.5.3 Comparing o¤er regimes
We can also compare the equilibrium outcomes for the two o¤er regimes.
Proposition 2.8 Comparing the least-cost o¤ers in the two o¤er regimes by which
S can deactivate all tax havens, the least-cost simultaneous joint o¤er is less costly
for S than the least-costly sequential independent o¤ers.
The result in Proposition 2.8 follows directly from a comparison of Propositions
2.6 and 2.7: the necessary deactivation payments in the sequential o¤ers regime
exceed the benets of deactivation, but the payments in the simultaneous joint o¤er
34
Chapter 2. Fighting Multiple Tax Havens
regime do not. Hence, the sum of compensations is lower in the simultaneous joint
o¤er regime than in the sequential regime.
Intuitively, in the case of simultaneous joint o¤ers, none of the tax havens can
hope to become the only active tax haven in the competition phase. When deciding
about staying active, they compare the compensation o¤ered to their payo¤ in a
situation in which they compete with other tax havens. In the sequential regime, the
possibility of becoming a monopoly tax haven plays an important role. The second
tax haven that is approached is the monopoly tax haven in this case. Therefore,
much more must be o¤ered to this tax haven in order to make it attractive for the
haven to become inactive.
To illustrate the potential magnitude of the e¤ect, consider, for instance, limh1 =
limh2 = 0. In this case, if both tax havens are active, they earn zero payo¤s, as all
existing mobile capital perceives the two havens as perfect substitutes in a Bertrand
game. In the equilibrium in Proposition 2.6, the country S can close down both tax
havens by making joint simultaneous o¤ers that sum up to b1 + b2 = 0 + 0 = 0. In
the sequential game, the equilibrium payment o¤ers are bi + bj(:) = 0 + r.
2.6 Robustness
We now illustrate why the results are qualitatively robust.
The case n > 2: First, let the number of havens Hi be n  2, with an immobile
capital segment s and a fully mobile segment  and with h1 > h2 > ::: > hn the
segments of capital that are mobile only between S and the respective tax haven.
Turning to the competition phase of the game, suppose the government in S has
chosen t > 0. Let there be a subset of m tax havens denoted as H^1;...; H^m that are
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still active, with h^i the capital segment of H^i that is mobile only between S and H^i,
and let them be sorted such that h^1 > h^2 > ::: > h^m. These havens compete for
the fully mobile capital share  by their choices of fees, with p^i chosen by each H^i.
The equilibrium choice is p^1 = t if m = 1 and the payo¤ is t(h^1 + s) for m = 1,
i.e., if there is only one active haven. If there are more than 1 active havens, the
equilibrium payo¤s are described by
E(^i) = h^it for H^i with i = 1; :::;m  1; and (2.20)
E(^m) =
h^(m 1)t
h^(m 1) + 

h^m + 

for H^m.
Moreover, the tax havens H^1;...; H^m 2 choose a deterministic price p^i = t and the two
havens with the smallest capital segments choose mixed strategies that are identical
with the mixed strategies characterizing the equilibrium in the above analysis for
n = 2; with H^m 1 and H^m assuming the roles of H1 and H2 in Sections 2.3-2.5. This
follows from Kocas and Kiyak (2006) who generalize Narasimhan (1988) to the case
of n asymmetric competitors. Note that (2.20) also describes the equilibrium payo¤s
for m = n, in which case H^i = Hi, and (2.20) reduces to (2.7) for m = 2. Given
this result, it follows from similar arguments as in Section 2.3 that the optimal tax
strategy of S also remains t = r, provided that the shadow price of public funds is
su¢ ciently high.
This concludes a brief description of the possible equilibria that can emerge in
the continuation game in the competition phase for the general case. Turn now
to the deactivation phase. Consider the smallest simultaneous joint o¤er to all tax
havens for which an equilibrium with complete deactivation of all tax havens exists.
If S makes a bid to each haven that is equal to the havens equilibrium payo¤ as in
(2.20) for m = n, each haven will be just indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting
this o¤er. Assuming again the same tie-breaking rule as in the previous sections,
an equilibrium of the continuation game for this vector of bids is that all havens
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accept the bids. Hence, for n > 2, the amount of payments needed to deactivate all
havens by a simultaneous joint o¤er is again the sum of the equilibrium payo¤s that
accrue to the havens if all havens stay active. For the sequential approach, there
are more than two possible sequences of sequential o¤ers. For any sequential o¤er
choice, however, the deactivation of one haven will cause an increase in market power
for the tax havens that remain, making the sum of necessary bids exceed the bids
necessary for deactivating all tax havens in case of a simultaneous joint o¤er for any
possible sequencing. It can be shown that S ideally makes o¤ers rst to the set of
tax havens Hi for i = 1; :::; (n  2) who have larger capital segments and then turns
to the two remaining havens with the two smallest capital segments. It can also be
shown that the sequencing within the group of havensH1 toHn 2 is payo¤-irrelevant.
Finally, when turning to the last two havens Hn 1 and Hn, it is less expensive for S
to deactivate Hn 1 prior to the last haven Hn. The o¤ers made to the rst n  2 tax
havens are then equal to rhi, and the o¤ers to the remaining two tax havens are the
same as in sections 2.3-2.5 for n = 2. If this sequencing is chosen, the deactivation of
the rst (n 2) havens does not lead to a noticeable increase in market concentration.
And for the last two remaining havens the results of the previous sections continues
to hold one-to-one. If, instead, S chooses a di¤erent sequencing and deactivates one
of the havens with the two smallest capital segments hi early on, then this tends to
increase the overall cost of complete deactivation compared to a sequencing where
the deactivation of Hn 1 is the penultimate deactivation followed by a deactivation
of Hn.
A quantitative assessment. In this subsection we quantitatively assess the size
of the di¤erence in compensation levels needed for the deactivation of n tax havens in
the sequential and in the simultaneous regime. We assume that a sequential approach
uses the most e¢ cient sequencing, i.e., closes down the tax havens n  1 and n with
the smallest partially mobile capital segments last.
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For the share of nancial assets hidden in tax havens and the total level of world
nancial capital, we use estimates provided by Zucman (2011). According to his
study, 8 percent of global household net nancial wealth is held in tax havens, one
third of which is located in Switzerland.22 Accordingly, we take (1 s) = +i=ni=1hi =
0:08. We abstract from the precise composition of (h1; :::; hn) and simply assume that
hi = hi+1 + " for very small but positive " for all i = 1; 2:::; (n   1):23 For the ease
of numerical calculations we use the approximation hi  hj  h. Accordingly, we
have hn +  = (1=3)(0:08) = 2: 666 7100 , and (n  1)h = (2=3)(0:08), or h = 0:05 333 3n 1 . We
also use a tax rate t = 0:25 for our calculation.24 The OECD had 35 countries on its
initial black list, hence we use n = 35.
This yields an estimation for the compensation for the simultaneous regime of
(n   1)htY + h(m 1)t(hm + )=
 
h(m 1) + 

Y = 0:014 Y: Similarly, the estimation
for the total compensation in the sequential regime is (n   1)htY + (h + )tY =
0:02Y . Using Zucmans estimate for total world nancial wealth, which is Y = 73:6
trillion USD, these total compensations amount to 1:03 trillion USD and 1:48 trillion
USD, respectively.25 In the sequential regime, compensation required for each of the
34 rst tax havens is 29 billion USD and 490:8billion USD for the last haven - almost
17 times higher than the deactivation of one of the previous havens.
Other types of competition. Intuitively, the generalization of the structure of
competition to n > 2 is a generalization of Bertrand competition for more than two
22We take these values at face value. A reliable estimation of the share of concealed
nancial capital is naturally di¢ cult. Zucmans (2011) estimation relies on the systematic
imbalance between global nancial assets and liabilites.
23Note that this yields a conservative estimate. A more asymmetric distribution of
partially mobile segments yields an even higher di¤erence in compensation payments.
24This tax rate choice is, to some extent, arbitrary.
25Zucman (2011) bases his estimates on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) external wealth
of nations extended database and the Coordinated Portfolio Investemnt Survey (2002) by
the IMF.
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competitors. For Bertrand price competition with perfect substitutes (i.e., hi = 0 for
all i), two competitors are su¢ cient to compete away all rents among the competitors,
and a move from two to many competitors does not induce stronger competition. The
main e¤ect of increased concentration takes place in this case by moving from two
suppliers (essentially with perfect competition) to just one supplier (who becomes a
monopolist). The culmination of competition e¤ects at the change from m = 2 to
m = 1 is specic to this type of competition and should not be overemphasized. For
many types of competition, such as Cournot competition or for Bertrand competition
with imperfect substitutes, the increase in market concentration induces a smooth
increase in the sum of suppliersrents. Analyzing the problem of simultaneous versus
sequential deactivation of many havens in other competition frameworks would result
in a smoother result that is even more in line with the intuition: with the elimination
of each additional haven the rent of each haven that remains active would increase
by two e¤ects: rst a smaller number of havens would share the market remaining,
attributing a larger market segment to each of them, and second, the equilibrium
price would also typically increase as the number of competitors is reduced.
A comparison with mergers among tax havens. It is also interesting to com-
pare the basic mechanism here with the merger paradox considered by Salant et al.
(1983). They consider an oligopoly and show that a merger of a subset of rms is
often not protable for the rms merging, unless it leads to monopoly.26 The intu-
ition for the result is that a merger between two rms in an industry with n rms
increases the prot of the whole industry due to the increased concentration, but the
two rms merging su¤er from the fact that their share in this industry prot drops
from 2=n to 1=(n  1). This e¤ect makes a merger protable for two merging rms
for n = 2, but typically not for n > 2, raising the issue of endogeneity of merger deci-
sions that benet non-merging rms by more than the rms that actually merge (see,
26For a survey on this literature see Huck et al. (2008).
39
Chapter 2. Fighting Multiple Tax Havens
e.g., Horn and Persson 2001).27 The OECD problem of deactivating tax havens has
a di¤erent structure. Not a merger among tax havens reduces competition between
them, but the OECD deactivates single havens and increases concentration among
those who stay in business. This typically increases the payo¤ that is obtained by
the tax havens as a whole, and the share of this received by each single tax haven.
And the deactivated tax haven does not simply merge with one of the others and
shares payo¤ with this other haven: instead, it receives a compensation payment for
its exit, and this payment is made not by the other tax havens, but by the OECD (or
country S in the model). Accordingly, deactivation of one of n tax havens increases
the payo¤ of all tax havens remaining in a twofold manner: Each of them receives a
larger share in an increased group payo¤.
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter considers the problem of how to deactivate tax havens in a world with
multiple tax havens. The ght against tax havens has many aspects that we did
not address here. For instance, we disregarded the problem of coordinated action
among the non-tax-haven countries, and rather considered one big non-haven country
or player such as the OECD that is able to internalize the benets and cost of a
deactivation initiative such as the Harmful Tax Practices Initiative. Our analysis
highlights an important issue that is largely neglected in the current ght against
tax havens: Once this ght shows some initial success, that is, once some of the
tax havens have successfully been approached and convinced to close down their
operations, this will change the nature of competition among the tax havens that
remain active. Competition between these tax havens will relax, due to the exit of
27The Merger Paradox may actually explain why, in the absence of the OECD initiative,
the tax havens fail to enact a merger process among the group of tax havens that yields
an increase in industry concentration which they may consider desirable.
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some of their competitors. The rents they earn from their "services" to nancial
capital, and other tax haven "services" more generally, increase as the number of tax
havens is reduced. This e¤ect has a number of relevant implications, which we argue
are robust with respect to many modications in the competition framework.
First, it reveals that a sequential ght against tax havens is easier in its initial
phase. The initial series of successes in the ght against tax havens clouds the size
of the true problem. It should not make us condent as regards the likelihood of
nal success. The more tax havens have been closed down, the harder it will be
to convince the remaining tax havens to give up their tax haven business. It may
actually become excessively expensive to close down the last few tax havens, as these
tax havens will earn very high monopoly rents.
Second, closing down just a few tax havens leads to a situation that is potentially
worse (from a welfare point of view of the OECD countries) than a situation with a
large number of tax havens. If many tax havens o¤er their services and compete for
capital, their fees will be low. Tax revenues will also be low, but at least the capital
(and its returns) remains with its owners in the OECD countries. If a major share
of tax havens have been closed down and only a limited number of tax havens are
still active, competition between them will be reduced. Hence, fees for tax-sheltering
services are high in the equilibrium outcome. Tax revenue in OECD countries may
still be low, but a large share of the returns of capital is taken away from its owners
and transferred to the tax havens (as fees).
Third, the analysis suggests that, if it comes to ghting tax havens, a coordinated
and conditional "big-bang" policy initiative which tries to form a simultaneous multi-
lateral agreement between all non-tax-haven countries and all tax-havens is superior
(less expensive) compared to a sequential process of closing down one tax haven after
another. If a "big-bang" policy is not feasible and only a sequential policy is possible,
then also the order matters for the cost of a sequential policy.
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3.1 Introduction
Since the nancial crisis, countries have shown a renewed interest in combatting
international tax evasion. In fact, during the 2009 G20 Summit, countries renewed
their commitments towards ghting secrecy jurisdictions by stating that the "era
of bank secrecy is over" and that they "stand ready to deploy sanctions" against
non-complying secrecy jurisdictions.1 Countries classied as tax havens answered to
the pressure increase with a surge in bilateral agreements which contain information
exchange clauses. However, the mechanism driving the choice of treaty partner and
type of bilateral information exchange agreement signed has remained unclear. This
chapter studies recent treaty signings between tax havens and OECD countries. More
specically, it empirically analyzes the main factors determining the signing of an
agreement as the outcome of a bargaining process between tax havens and high tax
1See G20 (2009) p.4.
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countries.
There are two di¤erent types of agreements that can be signed between a tax
haven and a high tax country: a Double Taxation Convention (DTC) and a Tax
Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA). We use a highly stylized bargaining model
to develop testable hypotheses with regards to the type of agreement signed. We
show that the main determinants of the outcome of a bargaining framework are: the
general bargaining position of a tax haven versus a high tax country, the e¤ectiveness
of the defensive measures that can be used by the high tax country against a tax
haven, and the share of capital which is evaded in the tax haven country. We argue
that the respective bargaining positions are a function of each countrys respective
economic position, while the e¤ectiveness of the defensive measures are a function of
the strength of the bilateral relationship. We show that a stronger bargaining position
of the tax haven should lead to a more advantageous signing from the perspective of
the haven, while an increase in the e¤ectiveness of the defensive measures shifts the
bargaining outcome more to the liking of the high tax country.
The empirical analysis, which uses an ordered maximum likelihood regression
model, shows that the main drivers of treaty signing are haven-specic characteris-
tics such as economic strength and good governance. Interestingly, bilateral similarity
and geographical proximity characteristics seem to be unrelated to treaty outcomes,
while bilateral nancial relationship variables play a role albeit a weaker one com-
pared to the haven-specic characteristics.
There are a few theoretical contributions on countries incentives to exchange
information that have focused on the question of the optimal use of an information
exchange clause versus a withholding tax regime.2 A main insight of these papers
is that larger countries have a stronger incentive to pursue an information exchange
2The main contributions are Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995, 2000), Huizinga and Nielsen
(2003) and Keen and Ligthart (2006,2007).
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regime than smaller countries. Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000), for example, theo-
retically investigate under which circumstances countries are more likely to sign a
tax treaty and when an information exchange clause will be included in the treaty.
Most relevant to our study is that they show that an information exchange clause
will not be used when there are one way capital ows. Consequently, a rationale
for the reluctance of tax havens to sign any type of agreement is provided. Con-
trary to our approach, there is no explanation for the di¤erent types of agreements
signed. We contribute to this literature by arguing that treaties and treaty types
are outcomes of a bargaining process. A similar approach can be found in Chisik
and Davies (2004). According to their paper, countries bargain over a withholding
tax for foreign owned capital. The paper focuses on how bargaining can a¤ect the
agreed upon withholding taxes and shows that greater asymmetry in FDI activity
increases the negotiated tax rates. Their empirical analysis, however, is driven by
treaties already signed and disregards the cases where treaties have not been signed.
In contrast, this study provides a more thorough investigation of treaty formation
as it does not ignore the cases where no treaty was signed and in fact, attempts to
provide an explanation for this empirical observation. Another relevant study on the
economics of tax treaties is Ligthart et al. (2011), which empirically investigates the
determinants of income tax treaty formations. In their study, they nd that the
main driver of DTC signing is the avoidance of double taxation and that information
exchange plays a rather small role. Their paper, however, disregards the fact that
the relationship between any two countries that are not tax havens, is an inherently
di¤erent one than in the case of a country pair which consists of one high tax coun-
try and a tax haven. Specically, while the signing of a tax treaty for two non-tax
haven economies can be mutually advantageous, a treaty between a tax haven and
a high tax country cannot be viewed in the same vein. Thus, by isolating country
pair constellations that include a high tax country and a tax haven, we allow a more
thorough investigation of the determination of these types of agreements.
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Next to the literature on tax treaties and the inclusion of an information exchange
clause, our study is also related to the general tax haven literature. This strand of lit-
erature has mainly concentrated on the welfare e¤ects of the existence of tax havens.3
A recent strand of this literature has particularly focused on the strategic implica-
tions of the ght against tax havens. In this literature we are more closely related to
Elsayyad and Konrad (2012), who theoretically analyze the observed sequentiality
of the ght against tax havens. The ght against tax havens has also been tackled
in the empirical literature, mainly by Huizinga and Nicodéme (2004); Kudrle (2009)
and most recently Johannessen and Zucman (2012) who attempt to evaluate how the
signing of tax information exchange agreements and the blacklisting of tax havens
have a¤ected international deposits.4 The previous papers present TIEA signings as
a fait accompli and concentrate on their economic implications without explaining
the mechanism behind their existence. Thus, our study contributes to this strand of
literature by studying treaty formation as the endogenous outcome of a bargaining
process which, in turn, is a¤ected by the level of international deposits held in each
tax haven country.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the institutional set
up of tax treaty signing, Section 3.3 presents the analytical framework and derives the
theoretical hypotheses, Section 3.4 presents the estimation strategy and discusses the
dependent and explanatory variables and Section 3.5 presents the regression results
and provides a robustness analysis. Section 3.6 concludes.
3See Desai et al. (2006a) , Desai et al. (2006b) , Hong and Smart (2010) and Jo-
hannessen (2010) for notable examples of a positive view on tax havens and Slemrod and
Wilson (2009) and Torvik (2009) for a negative view on tax havens. For a survey see
Dharmapala (2008).
4The rst two studies do not nd a signicant e¤ect of the OECDs ght against tax
havens. However, both studies use data that before the recent surge in signings starting in
2009. Johannessen and Zucman (2012) estimate a decline international deposits in reaction
to a signing of a TIEA but also an increase in deposits to countries not complying to the
international tax and transparency standards.
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3.2 Institutional setting
Agreement form. In an e¤ort to show commitment to tax transparency and ex-
change of information, tax havens can agree to sign one of two types of agreements:
a Double Taxation Convention (DTC), also called income agreements, or a tax in-
formation exchange agreement (TIEA). Both agreements can include provisions that
regulate tax-related information exchange. A signing of a tax treaty, which includes
an information exchange clause, allows for the correct estimation of each individuals
income and, consequently, the correct tax burden. The two agreements, however,
di¤er in their scope. While a DTC is mainly signed to foster and alleviate the double
taxation of cross-border investment and can include an article that regulates infor-
mation exchange, a TIEA only regulates the ow of information between a tax haven
and a high tax country and does not include other dimensions. The most widely ac-
cepted legal basis for bilateral exchange of information for tax purposes is Article 26
of the OECD Model Tax Convention. It creates an obligation to exchange informa-
tion that is "foreseeably relevant to the correct application of a tax convention as
well as for purposes of the administration and enforcement of the domestic tax laws
of the contracting states." Article 26 can be added to a DTC. The TIEA is also based
on Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, however, it includes stronger and
more detailed regulations for information exchange. Thus, from the perspective of a
tax haven, there is a natural preference ranking between the di¤erent outcomes. A
tax haven would most prefer not to sign an agreement which complicates and impedes
its capital concealment services. But if it would have to comply to one of the two
agreements, the signing of a DTC would be preferable to the signing of a TIEA. This
is due to the fact that there is a potential cross-border investment gain from signing
a DTC, whereas a TIEA does not yield any such advantage. Anecdotal evidence
supports this assumption. The Bahamas, for example, clearly state on their o¢ cial
website, with regard to treaty signing strategies, that they strictly prefer the signing
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of a DTC over a TIEA.5 Notice that the EU Savings Tax Directive is another infor-
mation exchange scheme used by EU countries. According to this scheme, countries
either commit to an automatic exchange of information or a withholding tax regime
on income of residents from other EU countries. This initiative is clearly multilateral
and cannot be assumed to work in the same way as the bilateral agreements. For
this reason, we only control for it in the robustness checks section.
Defensive measures. To induce tax havens to comply with international tax and
transparency standards, the OECD report on Harmful Tax Practices also proposes
a number of defensive measures that can be used against non-complying jurisdic-
tions.6 The defensive measures can be grouped into three categories: domestic tax
measures, non-related tax measures and tax treaty measures. Domestic tax mea-
sures can be characterized by a punitive discrimination of foreign income originating
from, or owing to, a non-complying jurisdiction.7 Non-tax treaty measures focus
on the discouragement of nancial institutions from investment in non-cooperative
jurisdictions. An example for that is the tying of o¢ cial development aid to com-
pliance in tax transparency and information matters. Finally, tax treaty measures
can take the form of the termination existing tax treaties with countries that are not
prepared to engage in full exchange of information. Here, it becomes clear that such
defensive measures can be used in order to pressure havens into complying and that
the potential e¤ectiveness of the defensive measures is a function of the strength and
scope of the bilateral relationship.
5See http://www.businessbarbados.com.
6See OECD (1998) p.40-50.
7A main example is the new French legislation, where dividends, service fees and roy-
alties paid by a French entity to a beneciary in a blacklisted country will face a 50%
withholding tax.
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3.3 A simple bargaining framework
In order to develop testable hypotheses, we develop a highly stylized model of bar-
gaining over the type of agreement signed between a high tax country and a tax
haven. We extend the driving mechanism rst introduced in Bacchetta and Es-
pinosa (2000) to include defensive measures which inuence the tax havens business
negatively and allow for bargaining over the share of evaded income that can be
taxed domestically due to information exchange.
We consider a world with two countries, a high tax country S and a tax haven
H. Country S would like to tax the capital stock of its residents. We assume that
due to lax regulation and strong bank secrecy rules, tax haven H provides capital
concealment services that allow residents of the high tax country to evade taxes in
their home country. However, H also su¤ers reputational and/or nancial damages
due to being classied as a tax haven. As in Elsayyad and Konrad (2012) capital K
is solely owned by residents of S and is either invested in S and denoted by Kd or
evaded in H and denoted by Ke;
K = K d +Ke: (3.1)
Thus, the income of the tax haven amounts to
YH = pK
e  D; (3.2)
which consists of the revenue from concealing the share of capitalKe at price p minus
the defensive measures D that the high tax country employs in order to make a tax
havens concealment services less attractive.8
Due to the concealment services provided by the haven, S can only tax capital
8Note, that pKe  D  0: If not then, it would not make sense for the haven to remain
active, as the damages that the haven has to su¤er would be too high.
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invested domestically. Country Ss income amounts to
YS = tK
d: (3.3)
While it is also possible to assume a di¤erent payo¤ function for the high tax
country S, the main driver of the ght against tax havens is a revenue maximizing
one, and thus, we abstract from other motives of taxation.
We assume that countries bargain over  2 [0; 1], which denotes the share of
evaded capital which can, after the signing of the treaty, be taxed by S. For the tax
haven H, signing a treaty means the reduction of its income from capital conceal-
ment services by  and no longer facing the defensive measures of S: For the high
tax country S, signing a treaty means a higher amount of capital that it can tax
domestically. Thus, H 0s income after the signing of a treaty amounts to
Y H = (1  ) pKe; (3.4)
and S 0s income after the signing of a treaty amounts to
Y S = t(K
d + Ke): (3.5)
It is straightforward to see that a tax havens income is decreasing in  and, thus,
given the unconstrained choice, its optimal  would amount to zero. Furthermore,
a high tax country would favor a high share of capital to be taxed domestically.
Conversely, the high tax countrys unconstrained choice of  would be  = 1:
We use the generalized Nash bargaining solution to derive the results of the
bargaining process.9 Consequently, the solution can be found by choosing an  which
maximizes a weighted product of the two countries gains from treaty formation.
Thus,  must satisfy:
 () 2 argmax (Y H   YH)(Y S   YS)1  (3.6)
9Given that the observed country pairs are inherently asymmetric, we abandon Nashs
symmetry axiom.
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where  represents the relative bargaining power of the tax haven H:
Taking the rst derivative with respect to  yields
 =
(1  )D
pKe
: (3.7)
Note that when  = 0; the high tax country has all the bargaining power and the
chosen share will be as close to  = 1 as possible: Analogously, when the tax haven
enjoys all the bargaining power due to  = 1; the optimal  is 0.
From equation (3.7), we can derive a set of comparative statics which helps us to
determine the testable hypotheses.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose H and S bargain over the share of formerly evaded capital
to be taxed by S; then the negotiated share  is:
(i) decreasing in ,
(ii) decreasing in Ke and
(iii) increasing in D :
Proof. Di¤erentiating (3.7) with respect to ; D and Ke yields
@
@
=   D
pKe
< 0
@
@Ke
=  (1  )D
p (Ke)2
< 0
@
@D
=
(1  )
pKe
> 0:
The derived comparative statics allow for the identication of the main drivers
of the bargaining outcome. It is straightforward that an increase in the bargaining
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power of the haven reduces the optimal share of  and shifts it more to the tax
havens liking. An increase in the share of evaded capital in the tax haven works in
the same direction. This is quite intuitive as the gains from treaty formation increase
for the high tax country and, thus, a tax haven can push a more favorable outcome.
A ceteris paribus increase in the defensive measures also shifts  quite intuitively. In
this case, an increase in the defensive measures is connected with an increase in the
gains from treaty formation for the haven: Here, the tax haven is unable to prot
from its tax haven business and is therefore more prone to accept a higher  to avoid
the defensive measures.
Consequently, we are able to show that the main determinants of the outcome of
a bargaining framework are the general bargaining position of a tax haven vs. a high
tax country, the e¤ectiveness of the defensive measures that can be used by the high
tax country against a tax haven and the share of capital which is evaded in the tax
haven. For the succeeding empirical analysis, we argue that the bargaining positions
are a function of each countrys respective countrieseconomic positions, while the
e¤ectiveness of the defensive measures is a function of the strength of the bilateral
relationship.
In the following sections, we empirically analyze the e¤ect of the di¤erent tax
havensspecic economic characteristics and the bilateral relationship on the bar-
gaining outcome.
3.4 Empirical analysis
3.4.1 Estimation strategy
While the optimal share of capital ij for tax haven i and high tax country j cannot
be directly observed, what can be observed are three di¤erent outcomes: For a given
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haven-high tax country-country pair, one can either observe no agreement, a DTC or
a TIEA. Notice that we include in our analysis only DTCs which have an information
exchange clause to capture the focus on the tax haven activity dimension of treaty
signings. DTCs signed that do not include the information exchange clause are
treated as if no agreement was signed. We argue that ij is an underlying latent
variable, that can be mapped into agreement form. We purport that low levels of ij
correspond to no treaty, middle levels of ij correspond to a DTC and high levels
of ij correspond to a TIEA. The ordinal character of the variable is based on the
institutional set up presented in Section 3.2. The continuous latent response ij is
related to the ordinal agreement form yij via the threshold model
yij =
8>>><>>>:
No agreement if ij  1
DTC if 1 < ij  2
TIEA if 2 < ij:
(3.8)
As developed in the previous section, the bargaining outcome is a function of the
evaded capital, the general bargaining power of the tax haven and the e¤ectiveness of
the defensive measures. While it is inherently di¢ cult to determine the share of the
evaded income, our main explanatory variables run along the lines of determining
the actual bargaining power of the tax havens and the possible e¤ectiveness of the
defensive measures. We argue that the actual bargaining power of a haven can
be traced to its own position and characteristics, while the pressure that a high tax
country can exert on it is determined by the strength of its bilateral relationship. Our
empirical approach, thus, needs to encompass both unilateral and bilateral variables
that explain treaty formation. In e¤ect, we would like to regress agreement form
on a tax havens bargaining power and the strength of its bilateral relationship with
the high tax country. For this, we specify a random intercept model for the latent
response ij :
ij = x
0
ij + ui + ij: (3.9)
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xij is a column of exogenous variables that includes both haven specic and coun-
try pair specic variables, while  is a conformable vector of coe¢ cients, ui is a haven
specic random e¤ect and ij is the usual independent and identically distributed er-
ror term. We assume that the haven specic random e¤ect ui and ij have normal
distributions and are independent. To t the random e¤ects ordered probit model,
we use a generalized latent linear and mixture model (GLLAMM) procedure.10 No-
tice that the need for a haven specic random e¤ect stems from the fact that the
observation unit is not an individual country but a country pair and, thus, one needs
to correct for possible error term correlations between the country pair observations
of each tax haven.
3.4.2 Agreement form
For the dependent variable, we consider all possible country pair constellations be-
tween OECD countries, which are not on the tax haven list themselves, and tax
havens.11 This amounts to (27 OECD*49TH)=1323 individual country pair obser-
vations. We combine the OECDs tax haven denition with the list of countries
provided in Appendix 2 of Hines and Rice (1994).12 For each generated pair, we
check if either a DTC that incorporates a strong information exchange clause or
a TIEA has been signed. The main sources of these agreements are the Interna-
tional Bureau for Fiscal Documentation Database and the OECD Global Forum for
Transparency for Tax Purposes.
We restrict our dataset to this subset of countries for two reason: First, the main
10See Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008).
11Note, that Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland are OECD countries that have been
found to fall under the tax haven denition. To ensure that our results are not driven by
these countries, we have in some empirical specications excluded them from the analysis.
12A list of countries and territories classied as tax havens under this denition are
presented in the Appendix.
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ght against tax havens has been initiated by OECD countries and main develop-
ments have always been spearheaded by the OECD Forum. Second, while the TIEA
model framework and Article 26 can be introduced and signed between any two
countries, they have been mainly developed to combat international tax evasion and
the concealment services of haven jurisdictions.
Out of the 1323 possible country pair observations, 155 DTCs that include a
strong information exchange clause and 323 TIEAs have been signed. The Bahamas,
with 18 TIEAs, has the largest number of TIEAs signed, while Luxembourg tops
the list for the highest number of DTCs with a strong information exchange clause
signed. A quick look at the signings shows that the Nordic countries have been
particularly active treaty partners. This is partly due to the fact that they adopted
a multilateral approach of treaty signing very early.13 Due to the fact that the bulk
of the agreements have been signed in 2009/2010, there is no meaningful longitudinal
variation in this measure and the analysis is restricted to a cross section.
3.4.3 Haven-specic characteristics
General characteristics of the haven have a strong impact on its bargaining position.
As previously posited, an increase in a havens bargaining power should decrease
the latent variable ij and, thus, be correlated with a stronger share of country pair
constellations where no agreements have been signed or where, at most, a DTC has
been signed.
A havens economic strength. A possible indicator of a countrys relative eco-
nomic strength is its GDP, and, for that reason, we have included the GDP of the
13In our estimation, one robustness check is to exclude country pair constellations of
tax havens with Nordic countries, in order to insure that our results are not driven by the
di¤erent multilateral approach of the Nordic countries.
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havens in 2006 (in current USD). The use of GDP in our analysis is particularly
advantageous, as it has the widest coverage. There are two possible explanation how
the size of the economic sector of a tax haven can a¤ect its bargaining position. On
the one hand, a large economic sector might make a tax haven less reliant on its tax
haven business and, thus, makes it less costly for the haven to comply with the new
tax and information standard. Following this line of thought, a large economic sec-
tor should be correlated with a stronger bargaining position for the high tax country
and, thus, a weaker bargaining position for the tax haven. On the other hand, one
might also argue that if a tax haven has a strong economic sector then, the cost of
closing down the tax haven business via a high tax country is much larger and the
need for multilateral coordination in this regard is much stronger. Thus, due to the
coordination problem, it might be that a larger economic sector is connected with
a stronger position for the haven and, thus, less compliance with international tax
standards. Notice that we already account for the possible bilateral pressure that can
be exerted against a tax haven in our estimation of the bilateral defensive measures.
Thus, our economic strength variable would pick up remaining variation that is not
explained by the bilateral economic relationship.
In a robustness check, we add the share of foreign direct investment outow from
the tax haven, as a share of its GDP, as a variable to capture a havens outward
nancial activity and disentangle it from its other economic activities. It is to be
argued that there is a direct correlation between the nancial importance of the
country and its bargaining position. Due to the limited coverage of this variable, we
analyze it separately.
A havens bargaining power can be also interpreted as its ability to exert its -
nancial independence. For this reason, we add a dummy variable which indicates
whether a haven is eligible for o¢ cial development aid or not. In this case, one can
assume that countries eligible for aid are more reliant on the international commu-
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nity and international good will and will, thus, be more prone to comply to the
international standards of transparency and information exchange. Consequently,
we expect a positive correlation between the share of signed treaties and the types
of treaties being signed.
A havens good governance. Taking into account that the decision to comply
with international tax information exchange standards is a function of a countrys
general good governance, we add a measure of countries governance institutions
developed for the World Bank by Kaufmann et al. (2010).14 We have constructed
an aggregated index of the world governance indicators for the year 2009 because it
has signicantly expanded coverage. In this case, we expect a positive correlation
between a higher good governance index and agreement form which translates into
a low share of country pair observations that have no treaty signed and a high share
of country pair observations wherein a TIEA has been signed.
3.4.4 Country pair-specic characteristics
Taking into account that agreement form is the outcome of a bilateral process and,
therefore cannot be solely explained by unilateral determinants, we include country-
pair specic characteristics to determine the scope and strength of the bilateral re-
lationship of each country pair. The bilateral relationship can be characterized by
the relative bargaining position of the high tax country and the e¤ectiveness of the
defensive measures that can be used by the high tax country against the tax haven.
14They construct aggregate country-scores for six di¤erent elements of country-level gov-
ernance: Voice and accountability, political stability, government e¤ectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Each of these measures takes values from
approx. -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values indicating better governnce. The data is normalized
so that the mean across all countries is 0 and the standard deviation is 1.
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Relative bargaining power. To control for the fact that the relative strength
of the high tax country also inuences treaty formation and can positively correlate
with the possible defensive measures, we include the di¤erence in GDP per capita
for each tax haven-OECD country pair. In this regard, we expect that a higher GDP
per capita di¤erence should correlate with a larger share of signed agreements.
Defensive measures. Next to the tax haven blacklist, which has also been used as
an instrument to generally pressure all listed tax havens into compliance with OECD
transparency standards, country-pair specic pressure should play a stronger role for
agreement form outcome. As a guideline for possible bilateral defensive measures, we
use the OECDs Harmful Tax Practices Initiative Reports recommendations high-
lighted in Section 3.2 of this chapter. While discriminatory measures can di¤er from
one OECD country to another, it stands to reason that their scope is highly depen-
dent on the importance of the bilateral relationship between a haven and a high tax
country. To capture all possible types of nancial ows between a tax haven and
high tax country, we add bilateral portfolio outows from OECD countries to tax
havens and bilateral foreign direct investments to our analysis.15 The third type
of defensive measure pertains to the status of the haven as a treaty partner. The
report proposes the scrapping of benecial tax treaty arrangements in order to pres-
sure non-complying jurisdictions. For this reason, we have added a dummy variable
which records whether or not a treaty was in force before 1998 and, consequently,
whether its potential termination could be used as method of pressuring tax havens
into compliance. In our dataset, there have been 38 cases of treaty termination, of
which 30 have resulted in new tax information exchange agreements; 8 country pairs
have remained without a treaty. Furthermore, 147 treaties have been renegotiated
to include the stronger information exchange clause. Taking our cue from the the-
15For non-tax treaty related ows, one could add bilateral trade and bilateral o¢ cial
development assistance to the analysis. However, both measures are only availabe for a
very few number of countries.
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oretical framework, we expect the defensive measures to positively correlate with
treaty outcome and, thus, a higher share of country pairs should be complying with
international standards and have either a DTC or a TIEA.
Control variables. We add bilateral control variables that should account for
country pair similarity. Specically, we have added a dummy variable for common
language and a bilateral distance measure. For missing bilateral distance measures,
we use the distance of the nearest country available. It is unclear how mobile capital
should react to distance, given that most tax havens are islands and, thus, rather
isolated. For the common language variable, if one assumes that evaded capital
is more likely to ow to countries that share the same language due to an easier
understanding of the environment and culture, one can assume a negative correlation
between agreement form and common language.16
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Benchmark estimations
In the following, we present the results of our benchmark estimation which can
be found in Table 3.1. All regression tables can be found in Section 3.7. Before
interpreting the coe¢ cients of the covariates there are two remarks to be made.
First, we use the standard ceteris paribus interpretation for the coe¢ cients. Second,
the haven-specic random e¤ect  i is shown to have a rather high standard deviation,
this means that there is a strong correlation between the outcomes for each haven.
This strong intra-class correlation already hints at the fact that haven-specic e¤ects
will have a strong impact on agreement form outcome.
16All variables and their sources are described in more detail in the Data Appendix.
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The rst specication of Table 3.1 empirically analyzes the relationship between
the bargaining position of a tax haven and agreement form. Accordingly, we include
all haven-specic characteristics while controlling for country pair similarity. This
means we regress agreement form on the tax havens GDP, average governance in-
dicator, o¢ cial development assistance eligibility and di¤erence in GDP per capita
between the country pair. In the subsequent specications, we then add the defensive
and bilateral relationship measures to the estimation to determine their correlation
with agreement form. The defensive measures include a dummy variable for treaties
signed before 1998 and the level of bilateral portfolio investment outow from an
OECD country to a tax haven (specication 2) or the sum of bilateral foreign direct
investment between a tax haven and a high tax country (specication 3).17 As is
common in all maximum likelihood estimations, the estimated coe¢ cients cannot be
interpreted directly. Nevertheless, they are proportional to the marginal e¤ects and,
thus, one can determine the impact of each covariate in relation. Furthermore, the
estimated coe¢ cients identify the estimated e¤ect of the variables on the rst and
last category unambiguously. In the following, we present and discuss the results of
the conditional model. The marginal e¤ects of the population averaged model can
be found in Table 3.8.
Haven-specic characteristics. Both GDP and the average of the havensgov-
ernance index show highly signicant and robust results. In all of the presented spec-
ications, an increase in GDP by one standard deviation increases ceteris paribus the
probability for the country pair observation to have no agreement signed and unam-
biguously decreases the probability of a TIEA being signed. This seems to favour the
notion that economically stronger countries are less responsive to pressure and, thus,
are more likely to choose not to comply to the international standards of information
17In order not to lose too many observations, we regress each of the bilateral measures
separately. Regressing both bilateral FDI and bilateral portfolio investments simultane-
ously does not change the results of the benchmark estimation.
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exchange. An increase in the governance indicator shows the opposite e¤ect. Havens
with a higher governance indicator ceteris paribus. show a smaller probability of
not having any agreement and a larger probability of signing TIEAs. This implies
that a high governance index is not only correlated with a strong regard for the rule
of law and transparency domestically but also a stronger compliance with interna-
tional standards. The benchmark estimations also show a positive impact of o¢ cial
development aid eligibility on the probability of complying to international tax and
transparency standards and signing TIEAs. This supports the claim that havens
that are eligible for o¢ cial development aid are more dependent on international
good will and, thus, respond more quickly to pressure.
Country-pair specic characteristics. Di¤erences in GDP per capita, which
is a country-pair specic variable, also show a robust and signicant correlation
with agreement form outcome that is in line with the derived hypotheses. In all
specications, an increase in the di¤erence in GDP per capita of a country pair is
correlated with an increase in the likelihood of signing a TIEA. Thus, one can argue
that the higher the di¤erence in wealth between a high tax country and a tax haven,
the higher the probability of having an agreement and a treaty form which is more
advantageous to the high tax country.
With regard to the defensive measures used in our estimation, it seems that the
treaty dummy has the strongest impact on agreement form outcome. We observe a
signicant positive correlation between the signing of a treaty before 1998 and the
inclusion of the strong information exchange clause through renegotiations. More so,
a higher level of bilateral portfolio outow from OECD countries to tax havens is also
correlated with a higher, albeit small, probability of countries signing TIEAs. Notice
that the pressure that can be exerted bilaterally does indeed work in the theoretically
expected direction. Surprisingly, bilateral foreign direct investment between tax
havens and the OECD countries seem to be uncorrelated with agreement form. The
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regressions imply that while treaty-related defensive measures have an impact on
the outcome of the agreement, nancial ows between the high tax country and the
tax haven do not seem to drive the bargaining decision. This begs the question as
to whether the defensive measures have been a successful mechanism of making tax
havens comply to international tax information exchange standards or not.
Control variables. Interestingly, the variables added to control for cultural and
geographic proximity show, only in the case of the common language dummy variable,
a signicant e¤ect on agreement form. While distance seems to be unrelated to
agreement form, sharing the same language is correlated with a lower probability
for the tax haven to comply with international standards and to sign any form of
an information exchange agreement. If one assumes that tax havens which share
the same language as the high tax country are more attractive to tax evaders from
the high tax country, then it seems that the estimated e¤ect goes in line with the
proposed bargaining model. This is due to the fact that an increase in the share of
capital evaded in the tax haven reduces the optimal agreed upon share of evaded
capital that can subsequently be taxed by the high tax country.
3.5.2 Robustness
In this section, we examine the robustness of the results of the benchmark estima-
tion. The performed robustness checks rst consider the ordered specication and
then either include more control variables, which might be perceived as a¤ecting the
outcome, or exclude some countries from the dataset in order to determine if the re-
sults are driven by these countries. All regression tables follow the same specications
as in Table 3.1.
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Robustness of the ordered specication. While the thorough analysis of the
conditions of the treaties shows that tax havens should prefer a DTC over a TIEA,
we can also analyze whether or not the main conditions needed to justify the use
of an ordered model can be found in the data. The fact that all the estimated
thresholds in the benchmark model are strongly signicant supports the t of the
ordered model assumption. An important implication of the ordered model is that
each category if treated separately should be driven by the same mechanism. Thus,
the results of the benchmark estimations should hold if one performs separate probit
regressions for each category. Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show two separate probit
regressions for the scenario no agreement versus the signing of a DTC or for the
scenario of no agreement or the signing of a TIEA. For each of the regressions, we
drop the country pairs, which have a di¤erent type of agreement, in order to focus on
the determinants of the signing of each of the agreements. The maximum likelihood
regression for the signing of a TIEA shows highly signicant estimated results similar
to the ordered probit regression. Interestingly, haven GDP is estimated to have a
signicantly stronger impact on treaty formation which seems to support the notion
that smaller countries have been the main countries signing TIEAS. The results of
the regression, which only focuses on the signing of a DTC versus no agreement,
show similar results to the benchmark estimation, however the results are in most
cases insignicant. These results, however, can be attributed to the fact that there
have been not enough DTCs signed between country pairs. Nevertheless, this seems
to suggest two things: rst, that the signing of a DTC and the signing of a TIEA
can be driven by the same independent variables and second, that the results of the
ordered probit are more strongly inuenced by TIEA signings.
Haven Foreign Direct Investment Outow. In the benchmark estimation, the
GDP of a tax haven seemed to have a signicant impact on agreement form. The
GDP variable can be thought of as capturing all economic sectors and not distinguish-
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ing between general economic sectors of the haven economy and the haven nancial
sector. Table 3.4 shows the results of the ordered probit regression for the same
specications as in Table 3.1 if one includes net foreign direct investment outow
of a haven as a share of its GDP. This variable is particularly interesting as it is a
clearer indicator for the importance of foreign direct investment for the havens econ-
omy. While the direction of the estimated coe¢ cients of the benchmark estimations
remain signicant and unchanged, the regressions show that a higher foreign direct
investment outow, as a share of GDP, is correlated with lower agreement forms.
More specically, an increase in a havens foreign direct investment net outow, as
a share of its GDP, decreases the probability of the signing of a TIEA as well as
increases the probability of a haven not complying to international standards and,
thus, not signing any type of information exchange agreement. Thus, it seems that
the increased openness of the haven with regard to foreign direct investment outow
also increases a havens bargaining power.
Savings Tax Directive. EU countries have a separate information exchange sche-
me that runs under the name of Savings Tax Directive. The directive is also upheld
by tax havens which are dependencies of EU countries. Consequently, it is not
far-fetched that such an information exchange scheme would have an e¤ect on the
information exchange agreement forms. In Table 3.5, we present the same specica-
tions as in Table 3.1 but also control for the existence of the Savings Tax Directive
between some tax havens and the EU countries in the sample. Interestingly, the in-
clusion of a dummy variable, which indicates if both countries comply to the Savings
Tax Directive, does not seem to have an a¤ect on agreement form and the estimated
e¤ects of the conditional model remained largely unchanged. This is a particularly
interesting result as it shows that the Savings Tax Directive is considered to be a
separate vehicle for information exchange. It also shows that the Savings Tax Direc-
tive has not acted as either a substitute for the bilateral agreements or encouraged
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the signing of such agreements.
Excluding OECD tax havens. In order to account for the fact that OECD coun-
tries that also bear tax haven characteristics might be treated di¤erently, Table 3.6
provides the conditional e¤ects for the dataset, excluding the OECD tax havens Lux-
embourg, Switzerland and Ireland. Our main variables of interest remain unchanged
by the restriction of the dataset. The only change documented is the fact that the
common language dummy no longer has a signicant negative e¤ect on agreement
form, but becomes insignicant. This seems to suggest that the e¤ect of the common
language dummy is mainly driven by the OECD countries of Luxembourg, Switzer-
land and Ireland.
Excluding Nordic countries. In another robustness check, we exclude country
pair constellations that include the Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway and Sweden (Table 3.7). This is to account for the fact that Nordic countries
have a distinctly di¤erent procedure of bilateral treaty signing which has shown
particular success. The results of our estimation with regard to the dataset excluding
the Nordic countries show some marked di¤erences to the previous results. While
haven GDP, di¤erence in GDP per capita, haven good governance and bilateral
portfolio outow to the tax haven remain signicant and robust to the exclusion
of the Nordic countries from the dataset, both the treaty variable and the o¢ cial
development aid eligibility variable become insignicant. This seems to imply that
the treaty measure has been largely used by the Nordic countries and has not been
put under as much use by the other OECD countries. The fact that the o¢ cial
development aid eligibility dummy variable loses its signicance when the Nordic
countries are excluded implies that the bulk of the treaties signed by countries that
are also eligible to receive o¢ cial development aid have been signed with the Nordic
countries.
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3.6 Discussion and conclusion
A rst glimpse at tax haven compliance after the G20 crackdown on tax havens,
initiated by the G20 London Summit in 2009, shows a strong surge of bilateral
agreements between tax havens and high tax countries implying the success of the
initiative. However, the main mechanisms driving the process of treaty signing have
remained unclear. In this chapter, we present a bargaining framework with which to
analyze treaty formation, taking into account that TIEAs and DTCs, even if both
include information exchange clauses, are not the same. Given that DTCs facilitate
cross-border investments, they are clearly more favorable to a tax haven than a
normal TIEA. Furthermore, it is clear that havens would not pursue the signing of
agreements which include an information exchange clause without outside pressure.
Thus, taking the natural ordering of the three possible agreement forms into account,
we estimate a random intercept ordered probit model to analyze how the potential
bilateral defensive measures and a havens bargaining position and characteristics
are correlated with agreement form. We show that the main drivers of the likelihood
of a specic agreement are each havens bargaining power and its average governance
index while bilateral indicators seem to have a smaller impact on agreement form.
More specically, we show that havens with a higher GDP are more likely to not
sign any agreements and havens with a high average governance index are more
likely to have a TIEA. O¢ cial development assistance eligibility seems to also have
a positive impact on agreement form, as countries, which are eligible for this type
of assistance, are more likely to have signed TIEAs. The case that a havens foreign
direct investment net outow, as a share of its GDP, is signicantly correlated with a
lower agreement form is also easily interpreted as it seems to be a good proxy for the
havens reliance on being a nancial hub. Possible defensive measures that should
have a stronger impact when the bilateral nancial relationship is strong are only
signicant in the case of bilateral portfolio outow, whereas, in the case of foreign
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direct investment, there does not seem to be any signicant correlation. The defensive
measure, which seems to have the strongest impact on agreement form outcome, are
the tax treaty related measure. We show that if an OECD country and a haven had
an agreement before 1998 in force, they are more likely to respond to pressure and
accept a renegotiation that includes the stronger form of the information exchange
clause.
A particularly interesting and strong result of our analysis is the fact that the
size of the havens economic sector has a highly signicant negative e¤ect on com-
pliance. Notice that this result holds, when we hold the strength of the bilateral
nancial relationship constant. Thus, it seems that while in line with the theory
that stronger bilateral nancial ties make exerting more pressure on the haven and
the havens compliance more probable, the overall size of the economic sector has a
positive impact on a havens bargaining position. A possible reason is that potential
bilateral pressure that can be exerted is already accounted for and in order to e¤ec-
tively "capture" the remaining economic sector by the high tax country multilateral
coordination is needed.
Taking our results into account, it becomes clear that the perceived recent suc-
cesses of the G20 crackdown have been mainly due to the active participation of
smaller tax havens. Stronger tax havens remain non-compliant and it is their char-
acteristics which mainly dene the agreement outcome. The nancial bilateral rela-
tionships in the case of bilateral portfolio investment seem to have a positive impact
on agreement form, but the strongest impact has been on tax havens which had
already entered into agreements.
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3.7 Regression Tables
Table 3.1: Benchmark Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. variable: agreement form
Distance -0.0735 -0.0710 -0.0305
-0.0485 (0.0509) (0.0539)
GDP -0.4590** -1.3340*** -0.8036***
(0.1498) (0.2764) (0.2058)
Governance index 0.9080*** 0.7209*** 0.9451***
(0.1645) (0.1544) (0.1643)
ODA eligibility 0.4257*** 0.1628 0.3994**
(0.1227) (0.2286) (0.1999)
GDP per capita di¤erence 0.3597*** 0.2813*** 0.6315***
(0.0470) (0.0663) (0.0812)
Common language -0.1269 -0.2098* -0.2679**
(0.1005) (0.1202) (0.1274)
Treaty before 1998 .3917** 0.4373**
(0.1502) (0.1634)
Bilateral portfolio outow 0.1020**
(0.0423)
Bilateral FDI -0.0082
(0.0400)
1 1.6864*** 1.2762*** 1.5431***
(0.2097) (0.2380) (0.2269)
2 2.0987*** 1.7718*** 2.0284***
(0.2121) (0.2399) (0.2316)
 i 0.9889 0.7576 0.9765
Log Likelihood -832.0007 -629.0557 -537.9602
N 1134 803 730
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
 represent the estimated cut-o¤ points.
 i is the estimated standard deviation of the haven-specic random intercept.
The data is standardized
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Table 3.2: Probit Regression for DTC Decision
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. variable: DTC=1
Distance 0.0159 0.0282 -0.0154
(0.0632) (0.0717) (0.0764)
GDP -0.1853 -0.2004 -0.1717
(0.1699) (0.1925) (0.1851)
Governance index 0.5879* 0.6731* 0.4361
(0.3287) (0.3562) (0.2966)
ODA eligibility -0.3865 -0.3557 -0.6578*
(0.466) (0.4301) (0.3425)
GDP per capita di¤erence -0.1055 -0.1861* -0.0781
(0.0868) (0.1026) (0.1087)
Common language -0.1456 -0.2184 -0.2164
(0.1551) (0.1768) (0.1824)
Treaty before 1998 0.6764*** 0.5928**
(0.1969) (0.2090)
Bilateral portfolio outow 0.0925
(0.0698)
Bilateral FDI 0.0568
(0.0589)
Constant -1.684*** -1.689*** -1.395***
(0.4776) (0.4958) (0.3883)
 i 0.6412 0 .6136 0.5357
Log Likelihood -288.7086 -224.2384 -196.2615
N 883 621 561
Subset of data with TIEA signings were dropped.
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
The standard deviations are in brackets.
 i is the estimated standard deviation of the random intercept.
The data is standardized.
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Table 3.3: Probit Regression for TIEA Decision
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. variable:TIEA=1
Distance -0.1265** -0.1603** -0.07161
(0.05496) (0.0678) (0.0735)
GDP -35.3503*** -39.963*** -28.769***
(5.999) (9.336) (7.106)
Governance index 0.6216*** 0.5928*** 1.015***
(0.1221) (0.1413) (0.1969)
ODA eligibility 0.0036 -0.1155 -0.0698
(0.1762) (0.2436) (0.2823)
GDP per capita di¤erence 0.5262*** 0.5123*** 0.8438***
(0.0620) (0.0835) (0.119)
Common language -0.1819 -0.2752* -0.3484**
(0.1243) (0.1532) (0.1679)
Treaty before 1998 0.8897** 0.6895*
(0.3095) (0.366)
Bilateral portfolio outow 0.2629**
(0.1251)
Bilateral FDI -0.3440
(0.5972)
Constant -11.3338*** -12.3634*** -9.5569***
(1.6471) (2.5451) (1.849)
 i 1.4489*** 1.316*** 1.3097***
Log Likelihood -419.0328 -290.4575 -248.9178
N 1012 697 643
Subset of data with DTC signings were dropped.
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
The standard deviations are in brackets.
 i is the estimated standard deviation of the random intercept.
The data is standardized.
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Table 3.4: Foreign Direct Investment net outow (% of GDP)
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. variable: Agreement form
Distance -0.0619 -0.0802 0.0024
(0.0509) (0.0550) (0.0604)
GDP -0.3537** -0.4850** -0.3250
(0.1738) (0.2018) (0.2230)
FDI net outow (%GDP) -0.2798*** -0.2328*** -0.3444***
(0.0552) (0.0587) (0.0754)
Governance index 1.4362*** 0.7394*** 1.1028***
(0.2156) (0.1496) (0.2183)
ODA eligibility 0.2018 0.1454 0.4076*
(0.1422) (0.1813) (0.2105)
GDP per capita di¤erence 0.7062*** 0.5213*** 0.7790***
(0.0701) (0.0872) (0.0909)
Common language -0.2461** -0.2833** -0.3046**
(0.1130) (0.1297) (0.1397)
Treaty before 1998 0.3774** 0.4434**
(0.1563) (0.1772)
Bilateral portfolio outow 0.1139**
(0.0431)
Bilateral FDI 0.0065
(0.0450)
1 1.7820*** 1.0437*** 1.4921***
(0.2540) (0.1940) (0.2414)
2 2.3235*** 1.6586*** 2.1064***
(0.2581) (0.1993) (0.2484)
 i 0.9018 0.8697 0.9413
Log Likelihood -622.3963 -498.9385 -422.9698
N 864 635 569
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
The standard deviations are in brackets.
 represent the estimated cut-o¤ points.
 i is the estimated standard deviation of the random intercept.
The data is standardized.
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Table 3.5: Savings Tax Directive
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. variable: agreement form
Distance -0.0705 -0.0756 -0.0293
(0.0444) (0.0507) (0.0539)
GDP -0.4485** -0.7488*** -0.8046***
(0.1472) (0.2119) (0.2063)
Governance index 0.8723*** 0.6736*** 0.9547***
(0.1298) (0.1470) (0.1667)
ODA eligibility 0.4711*** 0.3303* 0.3989**
(0.1261) (0.1879) (0.1945)
GDP per capita di¤erence 0.3636*** 0.3138*** 0.6304***
(0.0461) (0.0677) (0.0793)
Common language -0.1061 -0.2240* -0.2763**
(0.0998) (0.1222) (0.1292)
Common Savings Tax Directive 0.1489 0.0674 -0.0558
(0.1162) (0.1473) (0.1546)
Treaty before 1998 0.4475** 0.4528**
(0.1509) (0.1679)
Bilateral portfolio outow 0.1080**
(0.0418)
Bilateral FDI -0.0098
(0.0399)
1 1.722*** 1.25*** 1.533***
(0.1813) (0.2192) (0.2281)
2 2.135*** 1.748*** 2.018***
(0.1841) (0.222) (0.2329)
 i 1.018*** 0.7932*** 0.9707***
(0.1026) (0.1080) (0.1179)
Log Likelihood -831.1884 -628.1058 -537.8952
N 1134 803 730
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
The standard deviations are in brackets.
 represent the estimated cut-o¤ points.
 i is the estimated standard deviation of the random intercept.
The data is standardized.
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Table 3.6: Excluding OECD tax haven countries.
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. variable: agreement form
Distance -0.066 -0.0601 -0.0181
(0.0511) (0.0519) (0.0571)
GDP -2.51*** -0.77* -1.22**
(0.3564) (0.4077) (0.4374)
Governance index 0.946*** 0.513*** 0.970***
(0.1888) (0.1263) (0.1713)
ODA eligibility 0.3621** 0.3772** 0.3689*
(0.1278) (0.1829) (0.2165)
GDP per capita di¤erence 0.3427*** 0.1571** 0.6008***
(0.0515) (0.0636) (0.0856)
Common language -0.1010 -0.1383 -0.2217
(0.1062) (0.1267) (0.1372)
Treaty before 1998 0.4954** 0.4678**
(0.1602) (0.1753)
Bilateral portfolio outow .0978**
(0.0443)
Bilateral FDI -0.0149
(0.0401)
1 2.227*** 1.307*** 1.644***
(0.2612) (0.2034) (0.2466)
2 2.6158*** 1.7731*** 2.0890***
(0.2639) (0.2067) (0.2512)
 i 0.9432 0.9269 0.9498
Log Likelihood -767.23 -568.60 -485.21
N 1053 730 668
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
The standard deviations are in brackets.
 represent the estimated cut-o¤ points.
 i is the estimated standard deviation of the random intercept.
The data is standardized.
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Table 3.7: Excluding Nordic countries
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. variable: agreement form
Distance -0.1116** -0.0680 -0.0570
(0.0500) (0.05658) (0.0635)
GDP -0.4050** -0.5415** -0.5364*
(0.1648) (0.2685) (0.3012)
Governance index 0.5130*** 0.7675*** 0.6486**
(0.1280) (0.1987) (0.2402)
ODA eligibility .1392 0.1547 0.1235
(0.1340) (0.2428) (0.2979)
GDP per capita di¤erence 0.2115*** 0.1934** 0.4290***
(0.0530) (0.0872) (0.1191)
Common language -0.0635 -0.1527 -0.1346
(0.1090) (0.1295) (0.1410)
Treaty before 1998 0.0481 0.1990
(0.1921) (0.2049)
Bilateral portfolio outow 0.1362**
(0.0446)
Bilateral FDI 0.0134
(0.0429)
1 1.1793*** 1.2756*** 1.2092***
(0.1677) (0.2781) (0.3433)
2 1.6279*** 1.7655*** 1.7315***
(0.1705) (0.2830) (0.3470)
 i 0.8201 0.5943 0.7125
Log Likelihood -642.9783 -508.8957 -407.1334
N 924 672 568
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
The standard deviations are in brackets.
 represent the estimated cut-o¤ points.
 i is the estimated standard deviation of the random intercept.
The data is standardized.
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Table 3.8: Population-averaged marginal e¤ects
(1) (2) (3)
Category: No Agreement
GDP 0.1078 0.3772 0.2045
World Governance Average -0.2132 -0.2038 -0.2405
ODA Eligibility -0.0988 -0.0459 -0.1007
Distance 0.0173 0.0201 -0.0078
Di¤erence in GDP -0.0845 -0.0795 -0.1607
Common Language 0.0292 0.0575 0.0657
Treaty before 1998 - -0.1149 -0.1155
Bilateral portfolio outow - -0.0288 -
Bilateral foreign direct investment - - 0.0021
Category: DTC
GDP -0.0216 -0.0891 -0.0415
World Governance Average 0.0427 0.0482 0.0488
ODA Eligibility 0.0200 0.0109 0.0207
Distance -0.0035 -0.0047 0.0016
Di¤erence in GDP 0.0169 0.0188 0.0326
Common Language -0.0061 -0.0146 -0.0145
Treaty before 1998 - 0.0238 0.0202
Bilateral portfolio outow - 0.0068 -
Bilateral foreign direct investment - - -0.0004
Category: TIEA
GDP -0.0862 -0.2881 -0.1630
World Governance Average 0.1705 0.1557 0.1917
ODA Eligibility 0.0788 0.0351 0.0801
Distance -0.0138 -0.0153 0.0062
Di¤erence in GDP 0.0676 0.0607 0.1281
Common Language -0.0232 -0.0430 -0.0511
Treaty before 1998 - 0.0911 0.0952
Bilateral portfolio outow - 0.0220 -
Bilateral foreign direct investment - - -0.0017
N 1134 803 730
Bold characters signify signicant results in the conditional model.
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Chapter 4
Climate Uncertainty,
Irreversibility and Technology
Sharing
This chapter is based on joint work with Florian Morath.
4.1 Introduction
Getting countries to commit to new Post-Kyoto binding CO2 emission reduction tar-
gets has hitherto remained an elusive goal. A continued success on an international
scale, however, has been the support of renewable technology initiatives. For ex-
ample, the Cancun Summit in 2011 declared the start of a 1$ Billion new initiative
and fund for the exchange of climate change technology. Technology transfer mech-
anisms have always been a dimension of climate change agreements. Article 4.5 of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change states that countries
"shall take all practical steps to promote, facilitate, and nance, as appropriate, the
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transfer of, or access to environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other
parties."1 In fact, recent studies tracking the development of clean technologies show
its steady and persistent rise.2
This development is not surprising, given the strong national policies in support
of renewable technologies implemented by the US and the EU.3 However, the support
of renewable technology is often controversially debated. Investments in technology
can be protable if one perceives them as investments in new markets. But, in the
public good framework of environmental protection, a particularly persistent argu-
ment has been that unilateral investments in technology hurt the investing country
as other countries can reduce their e¤ort on climate protection in return. Given the
strong international support of technology sharing initiatives, this chapter provides
an argument in favour of the sharing of cost-reducing technologies. A country may
provide a new technology, because it can induce other countries not to delay their
e¤orts but instead to contribute to climate protection today.
To develop our rationale, three distinctive features, which inuence the decision
of contributing to climate protection, are taken into consideration. E¤orts to miti-
gate global warming are, to a large extent, private contributions to a global public
good. As such the strategic interaction between countries causes strong incentives
to delay ones own contribution since, in reaction to the high e¤ort of one country,
other countries can reduce their e¤ort on climate protection. Furthermore, interna-
tional coordination and the ght against climate change are further hampered by
the fact that there is uncertainty with regard to the need for climate protection and
a potential irreversibility of damages resulting from greenhouse gas emissions. The
uncertainty connected with climate protection stems from the fact that the costs and
1For example, the Stern Review (2006) identied a technology based-scheme to tackle
climate change as indispensible.
2See McCrone (2011).
3See Moselle et al. (2010) for an overview.
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benets of environmental damage and its reduction remain largely uncertain. Par-
ticularly di¢ cult is the assessment of the impact of climate change which is highly
reliant on di¤erent projections of the CO2 impact on temperatures .4 Consequently,
such strong uncertainties should push policy-makers towards a later contribution
to climate protection, i.e. after the resolve of the uncertainty. However, because
CO2 emissions are causing irreversible damages, delaying the ght against global
warming may be expensive. For example, the accumulation of CO2 emissions in the
atmosphere is hard to reduce and the damage to the ecosystems from higher global
temperatures, from acidied lakes and streams, or the clear-cutting of forests can
be permanent. Thus, a large part of this chapter analyzes how uncertainty and ir-
reversibility a¤ect the timing of the contribution to climate protection, given that
climate protection is a global public good.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we extend the framework of private provision
to a public good game to a model that incorporates the important trade-o¤ that
countries face when deciding on climate policies: uncertainty versus irreversibility of
damages. We derive the equilibrium contributions to climate protection and identify
the main mechanisms driving the timing of the contribution decision. We show that
for low degrees of irreversibility, both countries would like to wait until the resolve
of the uncertainty, while for high degrees of irreversibility the opposite is the case.
Our analysis, furthermore, shows that for intermediate ranges of irreversibility an
alternating equilibrium endogenously emerges, where one country contributes early
and the other country might contribute in the later stage of the game; a result
strongly in line with empirical observations.
Second, we analyze, for the case of technology sharing, how an investment in cost-
reducing technology by one country alters the timing decision of the contribution to
climate protection game. We identify two scenarios, where a country can invest in
4See Allen et al. (2009) for a summary on CO2 impact projections and their variability.
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cost-reducing technology in order to free-ride on the other countrys contribution.
We show that by a targeted use of cost-reducing technology, countries can switch
from one equilibrium candidate where they need to contribute to the public good to
another where they can free-ride on the other countrys contribution.
Thus, our model is related to the literature on the timing of environmental policy
adoption. Mainly developed by Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974) for the
case of irreversible investment under uncertainty, they show that there is an option
value to waiting until the resolve of the uncertainty in the one country framework.5
Pindyck (2002), for example, argues that due to the uncertainty and irreversibility
of damages that are often part of environmental protection considerations, environ-
mental policy design can involve important problems of timing. Consequently, this
study takes up the timing issue of policy adoption and introduces the notions of
irreversibility and uncertainty in the simplest two country-framework. This allows
us to isolate the e¤ects of uncertainty and irreversibility in a context of strategic
contribution considerations.6
Methodologically, our study is related to the standard literature on private pro-
vision to a public good. The standard static models of private provision to a public
good literature highlight free-riding as the strongest e¤ect in the private provision
of the public good game.7 In the simplest dynamic framework, our model exhibits
a strong free-riding incentive, similar to Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) and Admati
and Perry (1991), as countries would like to free-ride on the other players future
contributions. We contribute to this literature by exploring how uncertainty and
5See also Pindyck (1991) and Ulph and Ulph (1997) .
6Issues of timing have continued to play a role in the environmental literature with
the recent struggles of international coordination in the post-Kyoto era. See Schmidt
and Strausz (2011) and Beccherle and Tirole (2011) who analyse the impacts of delayed
negotiations.
7See the seminal work by Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Cornes and Sandler (1985). Also
see Varian (1994) on sequential contributions to a public good.
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irreversibility a¤ect the public good game equilibrium outcome.
Implementing a form of irreversibility in the dynamic public good game has rst
been introduced by Marx and Matthews (2000) and Lockwood and Thomas (2002).
There, the term "irreversibility" is more in line with the irreversibility of investment
notion where a contribution to the public good in a previous period cannot be taken
back. In Marx and Matthews (2000), it is shown that contributions gradually rise
to just above the e¢ cient one-shot game levels. Furthermore, contributors alternate
from one period to another, a feature which also endogenously arises in our analysis.
Bramoullé and Treich (2009) examine the e¤ect of uncertainty on pollution emis-
sions in a public good framework with risk averse countries. In the model the variance
of damages increases with pollution and, thus, polluters can reduce risk by decreas-
ing their own emissions. This result hinges on the risk aversion of the countries. In
our model, given risk neutral countries, we show that the irreversibility of damages
can induce similar behavior increasing the contributed level of the public good in
the early stage of the game. While there have been studies, which have analyzed
the e¤ects of uncertainty or irreversibility in the context of public good provision in
isolation, to our knowledge our study next to Morath (2010) is the rst to analyze
the e¤ects simultaneously.8
There is a growing economic literature on the interaction between technology
and the environment. For example, Bucholz et al. (2005), Buchholz and Konrad
(1994,1995) show that the public good nature of environmental protection might
induce countries to be "less green" in order to strengthen their bargaining position
in the environmental policy coordination game. This argument has been further
generalized by Beccherlé and Tirole (2011) and still holds true when introducing
uncertainty or dynamics.9 This robust result, however, stands in strong contrast to
8Morath (2010) introduces the trade-o¤ of irreversibility vs. uncertainty in environmen-
tal policy,however, in the context of strategic information acquisition.
9See Harstad (2010) and Konrad and Thum (2011).
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the steady rise of investments in renewable energy. Furthermore, the notion that
such investments can be used to reduce the costs of the other countries, but not the
country actually engaged in cost-reducing investments, is quite strong. Our model,
while not modelling the investment in cost-reducing technology strategically and
abstracting from bargaining over a cooperative outcome, identies scenarios where a
cost-reducing investment that is shared between both countries in the same way but
generates an outcome similar to the argument by Buchholz and Konrad (1994).
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the model framework,
Section 4.3 solves for the equilibrium contributions of the full model, Section 4.4
isolates the e¤ects of uncertainty, irreversibility, and free-riding on the timing of the
contribution. Section 4.5 analyzes the impact of the technology sharing of a cost-
reducing investment on the timing of the contributions and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Model framework
We consider a framework with two countries A and B and two periods t and t+1. In
each period, countries simultaneously choose a contribution to a public good where
xi 2 R+ denotes country is contribution in period  , i 2 fA;Bg and  2 ft; t+ 1g.
The marginal contribution cost in the two periods are assumed to be constant and
identical for both countries and are denoted by ct () > 0 and ct+1 () > 0;  refers
to the technology available to the countries, and ct and ct+1 are assumed to be
continuous and di¤erentiable in  (as explained below).
Individual contributions in the two periods sum up to the total amount con-
tributed to the public good. Hence, country is payo¤ is equal to
i = 
if
 P
=t;t+1
P
i=A;B
xi
!
  ctxit   ct+1xit+1, i 2 fA;Bg : (4.1)
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Here, function f translates climate protection e¤ort into a mitigation outcome. As
usual, f is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave, f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0.10
Countries only di¤er in their valuation of the public good, denoted by A and B.11
These country-specic valuations of the public good are independent draws from two
commonly known continuous distribution functions A and B with support

0; 

.
The functions A and B are assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable on
 
0; 

.
In period t, there is uncertainty about the valuation of the public good  that
will be resolved in period t + 1; consequently, both countriesvaluations A and B
become commonly known only between periods t and t+ 1. Overall, no country has
private information about its benet from climate policy: country-specic di¤erences
with respect to cost and benet of climate protection are typically observed. The
uncertainty in the model, thus, reects the di¢ culty of assessing the cost-benet
ratio and valuation of climate protection.12
We will restrict the analysis to probability distributions with the following reverse
hazard rate:
Assumption 1: 
0
i()
i()
 1

for all  2  0; , i = A;B:
This assumption ensures that the countriesmaximization problems in period t
are well-behaved and that the objective function is concave.13
10To simplify the exposition, we will assume that f 0 (0) ct+1 > 0 for all  > 0. Although
not important for our results, this assumption will imply that all types  > 0 will prefer a
strictly positive quantity of the public good, even if the contribution cost is ct+1.
11The heterogeneity in  captures all country di¤erences in the cost-benet ratio of
climate protection e¤orts, including di¤erences in the contribution technology.
12For example, in a review of impact estimates of climate change, Jamet and Corfee-
Morlot (2009) identify ve sources of uncertainty: greenhouse gas emissions projections,
the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere and how these emissions a¤ect global
temperatures, the physical impacts of a given increase in temperature, the valuation of
physical impacts in terms of GDP and the risk of abrupt climate change.
13Note that, for instance, uniform or exponential probability distributions fulll As-
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The aspect of the irreversibility of foregone climate e¤orts is reected in the
contribution cost. A general increase in average world temperatures cannot be easily
reduced, regardless of how advanced the abatement technology is. This is particularly
the case as CO2 stocks in the atmosphere very slowly dissipate. Furthermore, other
environmental damages like acidied rain and lakes can have considerable irreversible
damages. Thus, due to the irreversibility of damages, delaying mitigation e¤orts may
make future climate policy more expensive. Therefore, we assume that the marginal
contribution cost in t+ 1 is strictly larger than marginal contribution cost in t,
ct+1 () > ct () : (4.2)
Our analysis considers the e¤ects of an investment in cost-reducing technology
on the equilibrium climate protection outcome. We focus on the notion that invest-
ments in climate abatement technology are shared. Generally, successful investments
in R&D have strong spillover e¤ects, for example, through trade magazines and re-
verse engineering by competitors. In addition, patent protection for new inventions
and innovations only have a limited time frame. Furthermore, in the case of climate
abatement technology, such spillovers are more strongly encouraged through large
technology transfer initiatives. Thus, we consider investments in cost-reducing tech-
nology  2 [0; max] in our model which a¤ect the marginal costs of both countries
in the same way. Notice that 0 denotes the initial technology in use and max de-
notes the maximal technology to be used. Without explicitly modelling investments
in technology, we analyze whether or not, at the beginning of period t, a country i;
by improving the technology available to both countries, can alter the equilibrium
reached. We consider the case where an improvement in technology reduces both
periodsmarginal contribution cost, that is,
@ct ()
@
< 0 and
@ct+1 ()
@
< 0: (4.3)
sumption 1. This assumption is su¢ cient but not necessary for obtaining our results, but
it simplies the analysis considerably.
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Our analysis solves for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the following
game. In stage 0, nature independently draws the country-specic valuations of the
public good from the distribution functions A and B which are common knowl-
edge. Then, countries might invest in a cost-decreasing technology. In stage 1 coun-
tries A and B simultaneously choose their contributions xAt and x
B
t . Then, both
contributions and the country-specic valuations of the public good become pub-
licly observable. Finally, in stage 2 countries again can simultaneously choose their
contributions xAt+1 and x
B
t+1, and payo¤s are realized.
4.3 Contributions to Climate Protection
In this section, we characterize the countriesequilibrium contributions in the two
periods when contributions to climate protection are voluntary contributions to a
public good. In each period, the two countries A and B simultaneously decide over
their contributions to the public good. The countries contributions are strategic
substitutes, and, as we will show, the countriesoptimal contributions depend not
only on incentives to free-ride on the other countrys contribution but also on the
trade-o¤ between uncertainty and irreversibility of damages. We solve the game
through backward induction.14
14In the game specied above, no player has private information about his type at any
point in time, but each players type is only revealed after period t. Hence, to be precise,
a complete characterization of the equilibrium would require specication of the players
beliefs about their own and their co-players type. In our equilibrium analysis, we implicitly
assume that, in period t, each player i = A;B believes that his and his co-players type are
drawn from the distributions A and B respectively, and we solve for the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium under these beliefs. In period t + 1, both types become common knowledge,
and, thus, updating of beliefs does not play a role in our framework. For simplicity, we
omit this more complex notation.
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4.3.1 Preferred provision levels in period t+ 1
To solve for the equilibrium contributions, consider rst period t + 1. Here, the
countriesvaluations A and B are common knowledge and the game is strategically
equivalent to a standard private provision game with a given contribution Xt =
xAt + x
B
t .
15 We dene a country is preferred provision level of the public good in
t+ 1 as the quantity Qit+1
 
i

that solves is rst order condition
if 0
 
Qit+1
 
i
  ct+1 = 0; (4.4)
that is
Qit+1
 
i

:=
8<: (f 0)
 1  ct+1=i if i > 0
0 otherwise.
(4.5)
Qit+1
 
i

denotes the level of contributions up to which i would like to increase total
contributions. Notice that a country might only contribute a strictly positive amount
in period t + 1 if total period t contributions are Xt < Qit+1
 
i

: Moreover, due to
the quasi-linear payo¤ functions, in equilibrium one country at most will contribute
in period t+1; this country will be the country i with the higher preferred provision
level Qit+1
 
i

or, equivalently, the country i with the higher valuation i for the
public good. This country i raises the contribution level up to its desired quantity
Qit+1
 
i

, and country j 6= i free-rides and contributes zero.16 Hence, the equilibrium
contributions are given by
 
xAt+1; x
B
t+1

=
8<:
 
max

QAt+1
 
A
 Xt; 0	 ; 0 if A > B 
0 ; max

QBt+1
 
B
 Xt; 0	 if A < B: (4.6)
15Recall that the marginal contribution cost is constant.
16If A = B and Qit+1 > Xt, in t + 1 there is a continuum of equilibria with
 
xAt+1

+ 
xBt+1

= Qit+1. For completeness, we assume that in this case the symmetric equilibrium is
played, although A = B occurs with probability zero (due to the assumption of continuous
distribution functions A and B).
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4.3.2 Preferred provision levels in period t
Inserting the optimal contributions in period t+ 1 into country is decision problem
in period t, country i chooses xit to maximize its expected payo¤ i (x
i
t) in t, given
(Xt+1)
 =
 
xAt+1

+
 
xBt+1

and given xjt . Hence, denoting this expected payo¤ by
i (x
i
t), we get
i
 
xit

=
Z 
0
j
 
i
 
if
 
maxfQit+1; Xtg
  ctxit   ct+1  Qit+1   (Xt)+ di  i
+
Z 
0
(1  j
 
i

)
 
if
 
maxfQjt+1; Xt
  ctxit di  i : (4.7)
Taking contributions in period t + 1 into account, country i weighs the expected
probabilities of two scenarios: a scenario where it has the higher valuation in period
t+ 1 than country j, which occurs with probability j
 
i

, and a scenario where it
has a lower valuation than country j, which occurs with probability 1  j
 
i

.
In both scenarios (i > j and i < j), apart from the realization of the valua-
tions i and j, potential contributions in period t+1 will depend on the amount Xt
that has already been contributed in period t. Since country i might only contribute
in period t + 1 if its preferred provision level Qit+1 is strictly larger than Xt. Using
(4.5) we can dene by
^ :=
ct+1
f 0 (Xt)
(4.8)
the critical valuation for which a countrys preferred provision level in t+1 is exactly
equal to Xt. Consequently, only countries with a realized valuation  > ^ may
contribute in t+ 1.
Now consider country is expected marginal payo¤ from an increase in xit. Sup-
pose, rst, that the given total contribution Xt is smaller than Qit+1
 


where
Qit+1
 


denotes the preferred provision level in t + 1 of the type with the high-
est possible valuation . In this case, is marginal expected payo¤ from an increase
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in xit is equal to
0i
 
xit;Xt

=
Z ^
0
Z ^
0
 
if 0 (Xt)  ct

dj
 
j

di
 
i

(4.9)
+
Z 
^
Z i
0
(ct+1   ct) dj
 
j

di
 
i

+
Z 
^
Z 
i
( ct) dj
 
j

di
 
i

:
This marginal expected payo¤ in (4.9) consists of three terms representing three
di¤erent scenarios: First, if both countriesrealized valuations are smaller than the
critical valuation ^, then no contribution will take place in t + 1. Hence, with the
probability that i  ^ and j  ^, the marginal payo¤ is the di¤erence between
the marginal benet of public good consumption and the marginal contribution cost
(the rst term in (4.9)).
Otherwise, if is valuation is greater than the critical valuation, i.e., i > ^, then
i would, in principle, be willing to make a contribution in t+ 1, and its equilibrium
contribution will depend on whether j has a lower or higher valuation for climate
protection. Accordingly, the second term in (4.9) considers the case where i > j
and is equilibrium contribution in t + 1 is strictly positive. With the probability
that i > ^ and i > j, the marginal payo¤ of increasing the period t contribution
is equal to the di¤erence in the contribution costs, ct+1   ct: by increasing the
period t contribution, country i will save the higher contribution cost in t + 1. The
third term illustrates is marginal payo¤ given that country j has a higher valuation
(and j > ^); in this case, the marginal benet for country i is zero because this
contribution would have been made by j anyway, and a contribution only bears the
marginal cost ct.
Altogether, the three terms illustrate the trade-o¤between uncertainty (unknown
realization of the valuation) and irreversibility (higher contribution cost in t+ 1) on
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the one hand and the incentives to free-ride on the other hand. While the e¤ect of
irreversibility in the second term in (4.9) is always positive and the free-riding e¤ect
in the third term is always negative, the sign of the rst term depends on Xt. More
precisely, the integrand in the rst term in (4.9) will rather be negative for small
realizations i and positive for large realizations of i.
If total contributions Xt = xAt + x
B
t are su¢ ciently high, they will crowd out all
potential contributions in period t+1: Xt  Qit+1
 


implies ^  , and is marginal
payo¤ of an increase in xit reduces to
0i
 
xit;Xt

=
Z 
0
Z 
0
 
if 0 (Xt)  ct

dj
 
j

di
 
i

: (4.10)
Regardless of which valuation is achieved in period t + 1; no contribution will take
place. Consequently, considerations with regard to a potential cost or saving of
marginal contribution costs in period t+1 do not play a role. The expected marginal
benet of further increasing xit is simply equal to E
 
i

f 0 (Xt) and the expected
marginal cost is ct.
Optimizing over xit yields a preferred provision level Q
i
t in period t for country i,
provided that equilibrium contributions in t + 1 are as in (4.6). Notice that Qit > 0
does not imply that is equilibrium contribution (xit)
 must necessarily be positive.
Rather, Qit is the quantity that i would contribute to the public good in period t
if j does not contribute. Compared to Qit+1
 
i

, country is preferred contribution
level in period t + 1; which directly depends on i, the preferred level Qit of period
t depends on is expectations of the realizations of i, j; and the corresponding
equilibrium contributions in t+1. The following Lemma characterizes each countrys
preferred period t provision level. It is assumed, as for all following statements, that
(Assumption 1) holds
Lemma 4.1 Consider the quantity of the public good that a country prefers to be
provided in period t.
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(i) Suppose that E
 
i

=  ct=ct+1. Then country is preferred provision level in
period t is equal to Qit = (f
0) 1
 
ct=E
 
i

, i 2 fA;Bg.
(ii) Suppose that E
 
i

= < ct=ct+1.
(a) If
E
 
j
 
i
  ct
ct+1
; (4.11)
then country is preferred provision level in period t is equal to Qit = 0, i 2 fA;Bg.
(b) If
E
 
j
 
i

>
ct
ct+1
; (4.12)
then country is preferred provision level Qit in period t is uniquely determined with
Qit 2
 
0; (f 0) 1
 
ct=E
 
i

, i 2 fA;Bg.
Proof. See Appendix.
The idea behind Lemma 4.1 is straightforward. In Lemma 4.1(i), if the expected
to maximum valuation ratio E
 
i

= is higher than the irreversibility ratio ct=ct+1,
then country i prefers a provision level in t that is su¢ ciently high to crowd out all
further contributions in t + 1. In this case, Qit is determined irrespective of period
t + 1 and, hence, country i equates marginal cost and benet from contributing
based on its expected valuation. We will refer to such a situation as the case of a
"full" preferred provision level in period t, and it occurs if the expected valuation
and/or the degree of irreversibility is high (where the degree of irreversibility can be
measured as the inverse cost ratio ct+1=ct).
If, however, E
 
i

= is lower than the cost ratio ct=ct+1, then country i will never
want a full provision in period t already. In this case, 0i (0;Xt = 0)  0, or (4.11), is
su¢ cient to ensure that country i does not want to contribute in t, independent of xjt :
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This leads to Lemma 4.1(ii)a.17 By the same argument, if instead 0i (0;Xt = 0) > 0,
or (4.12), then country i prefers a strictly positive provision levelQit in period t. Here,
country i prefers only a "partial" provision in period t, accepting that, depending on
the true valuations, it might contribute again in t+ 1 (Lemma 4.1(ii)b).18
Which country prefers a higher provision level in period t? Due to the
quasi-linear preferences, the mechanism of the standard private provision of a public
good game persists in the contribution decision of period t. Positive contributions
by either country are perfect substitutes. Thus, if both countries prefer a strictly
positive contribution level in t, i.e., if QAt > 0 and Q
B
t > 0, then, in equilibrium, only
the country i with the higher preferred contribution level Qit > Q
j
t will contribute in
t. Concretely, this country will contribute exactly (xit)

= Qit, and the other country
will contribute zero in period t.
Before turning to the characterization of the equilibrium, let us consider the
determinants of whether Qit > Q
j
t that are implied by Lemma 4.1 in more detail.
If both countries prefer a full provision in period t, the country with the higher
expected valuation will bear the contribution cost. Since this quantity is increasing
in E
 
i

, i prefers a higher quantity if E
 
i

> E
 
j

: If one country prefers a
full provision and the other country prefers a partial provision level in period t; this
implies that E
 
i

= > ct=ct+1 > E
 
j

= and so, in this case, country i also is the
country preferring the higher provision level.
17In Lemma 4.1(i), if (4.11) holds with equality and Assumption 1 holds with equality
on some interval

0; 0

, then i is indi¤erent between all Qit 2
h
0; (f 0) 1
 
ct+1=
0i (see
Appendix). To simplify the exposition, Lemma 4.1(i) assumes that in this case Qit = 0. If
Assumption 1 holds with strict inequality, then Qit = 0 if and only if (4.11) is fullled.
18Note that E
 
i

= < ct=ct+1 implies that (f 0) 1
 
ct=E
 
i

< Qit+1
 


. Hence, in
Lemma 4.1(ii)b, Qit < Q
i
t+1
 


and there will be a positive contribution in t + 1 with
strictly positive probability.
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In the case where the countries only prefer a "partial provision" in period t, the
comparison of the expected valuations is no longer su¢ cient to determine which
country has the higher preferred provision level in t. For any partial provision level
Xt < Q
i
t+1
 


, the di¤erence between the countriesmarginal payo¤s of contributing
in t, 0A (Xt)  0B (Xt), is equal to
A

^

B

^
 h
E

AjA  ^

  E

BjB  ^
i
f 0 (Xt) (4.13)
+ct+1
"Z 
^
B
 
A

dA
 
A
  Z 
^
A
 
B

dB
 
B
#
where ^ = ct+1=Xt is the critical valuation below which countries will not contribute
in period t+1. Now, di¤erences in the countriespreferred provision levels in period
t are driven by two comparisons: rst, by di¤erences in the expected benet from
contributing, conditional on there being no further contributions in t + 1 (the rst
term: conditional expected valuation multiplied by f 0 (Xt)), and second, by di¤er-
ences in the expected equilibrium contribution cost in period t+1 (the second term:
ct+1 multiplied by the probability that this cost has to be paid).
In equilibrium, this comparison, evaluated at Xt = QBt ; yields
A

^

B

^
 h
E

AjA  ^

  E

BjB  ^
i
f 0
 
QBt

+ct+1
"Z 
^
B
 
A

dA
 
A
  Z 
^
A
 
B

dB
 
B
#
> 0 (4.14)
where ^ = ct+1=f 0
 
QBt

. Without making further assumptions on the cumulative
distribution functions, it is not straightforward when condition (4.14) holds. How-
ever, if the di¤erences in the marginal payo¤ of contributing in t are always in favor
of one country, it is clear that this country will have a higher preferred contribution
level. This is the case, for instance, if the countriesdistributions of the valuations
can be ranked according to rst-order stochastic dominance. In general, however, the
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rst and the second term in (4.14) do not need to have the same sign, and whether
or not QAt > Q
B
t will also depend on f
0 and ct+1.
4.3.3 Equilibrium contributions
The equilibrium contributions in period t follow directly from the analysis above,
which is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 In the equilibrium of the two-country case, the contributions in
period t are determined such that
(i) if QAt = Q
B
t = 0, then
 
xAt

=
 
xBt

= 0,
(ii) if QAt > Q
B
t  0, then
 
xAt

= QAt and
 
xBt

= 0,
(iii) if QBt > Q
A
t  0, then
 
xAt

= 0 and
 
xBt

= QBt ,
(iv) if QAt = Q
B
t > 0, then there is a continuum of equilibria with
 
xAt

+
 
xBt

=
QAt
where country is preferred contribution level Qit is given in Lemma 4.1.
Proposition 4.1 results directly from Lemma 4.1; hence, a proof is omitted.
If the irreversibility ratio ct=ct+1 is close to 1 (to be precise, if it is larger than
maxfE  j  i ; E  i =g; compare Lemma 4.1), then both countries prefer not
to contribute in t but instead to wait until period t + 1 (case (i)). Total expected
contributions to the public good are then equal to
Xt+1 = EA;B

max

QAt+1
 
A

; QBt+1
 
B
	
(4.15)
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since, in t + 1; the country with the higher valuation will contribute its preferred
provision level based on its contribution cost ct+1.
For intermediate values of ct=ct+1, at least one country will prefer a positive
provision level in t (cases (ii) and (iii)), and only one country will contribute in t.
For such intermediate irreversibility ratios, it will be optimal to choose only a partial
provision in period t, and there will be further contributions in t + 1. When ct+1
is high and, hence, the ratio ct=ct+1 is low, contributing in t becomes even more
attractive, and the country, which contributes in t; will choose a full provision in t
that crowds out all possible contributions in t+ 1.
Finally, if both countries prefer exactly the same contribution level in t (for
instance, if A = B), then there is a continuum of equilibria where the countries
contributions in t sum up to this preferred level (case (iv)).
The derived equilibrium contributions have several implications. First, it becomes
clear that if there is a positive contribution to the public good in any period, then
it will only be borne by one country. Furthermore, the contribution decision is
additionally a¤ected by the free-riding possibility. Depending on the irreversibility
ratio ct=ct+1, the optimal contribution level can be zero, a partial preferred provision
level or a full provision level which crowds out all further t+ 1 contributions.
4.4 Isolating the e¤ects on timing
In the following, we isolate the di¤erent motivations that drive the timing of the
countriesequilibrium contributions to climate protection.
The e¤ects of uncertainty and irreversibility on the timing of the con-
tribution. The countervailing e¤ects of uncertainty vs. irreversibility have been
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already made clear in the previous section. Now consider the case where there is un-
certainty about the valuations for climate protection but no irreversibility of forgone
e¤orts to climate protection. When ct+1 converges to ct, a contribution in t is strictly
dominated, independent of the remaining parameters of the model (for instance, the
probability distributions A and B). Both countries will prefer to wait until the
resolve of the uncertainty. A standard private provision of a public good game, based
on the realized valuations, will ensue in period t+1: Uncertainty is the predominant
e¤ect in case (i) of Proposition 4.1.
Now consider the case where there is no uncertainty but irreversibility; that is,
where the variance of A and B goes to zero but where the structure of the model
remains unchanged. In the limit where the valuations are already known in period
t, delaying the contribution until t + 1 is strictly dominated, as contributions in
t+ 1 cause a strictly higher marginal cost. Accordingly, both countries will want to
contribute in period t at the lower marginal costs ct. This is comparable to cases
(ii)-(iii) of Proposition 4.1, assuming that the equilibrium contribution (xit)

= Qit
ensures a full provision of the public good in t.
In summary, while uncertainty pushes the timing of the contribution to climate
protection towards a later date, irreversibility pushes the timing of the contribution
to climate protection towards an earlier date.
The e¤ect of free-riding on the timing of the contribution. To isolate the
e¤ect of free-riding on the optimal timing decision, consider the case in which there
is only one country (here country i) that decides over its contribution to climate
protection. The remaining structure of the model continues unchanged. Solving the
model through backward induction, it is straightforward to see that the rationale
driving the preferred provision level of period t + 1 is identical to the two country
case. The only di¤erence is that the preferred provision level Qit+1 (i) automatically
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constitutes the countrys equilibrium contribution in t+ 1.
Now turn to country is optimal decision in period t, taking into account that 
xit+1

= Qit+1 (i). Suppose that is contribution in t is smaller than Q
i
t+1
 


which
ensures a positive contribution in t+1 with strictly positive probability. Again, ^ =
ct+1=f
0 (xt) denotes the critical valuation below which there will be no contribution
in t+1. In the one-country case, country is marginal expected payo¤ from increasing
the contribution in t is equal to

0
i
 
xit

=
Z ^
0
 
if 0
 
xit
  ct di  i+ Z 
^
(ct+1   ct) dA () : (4.16)
Let us compare this marginal payo¤ to the marginal payo¤ in the two-country case,
as derived in (4.9). Similar to (4.9), the rst term in (4.16) describes the expected
payo¤ if there is no contribution in t+1 (because i  ^). This marginal payo¤ also
emerges in the two-country case (the rst term in (4.9)), but, there, only with the
probability that j also has a valuation below the critical valuation (j  ^).
The second term in (4.16) represents the savings in marginal contribution cost.
In the one-country case, these savings are realized whenever i > ^, while in the two-
country case, this positive e¤ect on a period t contribution also depends on whether
or not j < i. In the two-country case, even if country i has a valuation above the
critical valuation (i > ^), this does not necessarily imply that it has to pay the high
marginal cost ct+1 because j will bear the contribution cost if 
j > i.
Thus, the two-country case identies an additional negative e¤ect on the marginal
payo¤which corresponds to the possibility to free-ride and is not present in the one-
country case (the third term in (4.16)). In the two-country case, if it turns out
that the other country has a higher valuation, having increased the contribution in
t would have caused an unnecessary cost.
While the benets from an early contribution in the two-country case are realized
only with lower probability, the free-riding possibilities add a cost to contribution in
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period t that does not play a role in the case where there is only one country present.
Consequently, the existence of another country and the nature of the public good
problem lower a countrys marginal payo¤ from increasing the period t contribution
and shift the timing of the contribution towards a later period.19
4.5 Investments in technology and the timing of
contributions
Now consider the e¤ect of an exogenous investment in cost-reducing technology 
on countriestiming of the contributions to climate protection. Recall that the cost-
reducing technology  is dened such that an increase in  decreases the marginal
contribution cost for both countries over both time periods. More specically, the
cost-reducing technology is denoted by ; where  2 [0; max] and 0 denotes the
initial technology in use. We do not model the investment game explicitly but analyze
its e¤ects on the equilibrium outcome as regards the timing of contributions. The
results will directly clarify which country will have an incentive to invest in cost-
reducing technology, provided that the cost of investing is su¢ ciently low compared
to the benet of investing.
Our analysis will mainly focus on situations where the irreversibility ratio ct=ct+1
is strictly decreasing over the interval [0; max] of possible technology levels. This
is the case, when an investment in cost-reducing technology relatively reduces the
marginal contribution cost of period t more strongly than the marginal contribution
cost of period t+1: Intuitively, this can be interpreted as the notion that innovations
in cost-reducing technology made today are more suited to tackle climate protection,
given todays information, and that these technologies might be less e¤ective with
19One can argue that the inclusion of a second country exhibits the same free-riding
rationale as derived in Admati and Perry (1991) and Fershtman and Nitzan (1991).
95
Chapter 4. Climate Uncertainty, Irreversibility and Technology Sharing
altered conditions at a later date. For example, powerplants are characterized by
large sunk costs when investing in generation units. Their e¢ ciency is highly sensitive
to a changing regulatory framework, environment, and fuel prices and as such it
is likely that investments in such technology relatively reduce the costs, given a
certain regulatory framework, environment, and fuel prices, in the early period more
e¢ ciently than in the later period.
In the next two sections, we will rst analyze how an investment in cost-reducing
technology a¤ects the provision level and, then, we will identify cases where such
changes in the provision level lead to a change in the equilibrium outcome.
4.5.1 Categorical changes in the preferred period t contri-
butions
In the following, we identify how investments in cost-reducing technology can e¤ect
a "categorical change" in the preferred provision level Qit: We consider "categorical
changes" to be changes in the preferred provision levels in period t which are linked
with a change in the potential equilibrium reached. While marginal reductions in the
contribution costs ct and ct+1 always (weakly) increase total contributions, we focus
on "categorical changes" that a¤ect one countrys (or both countries) optimal timing
of the contributions, i.e., that a¤ect whether or not a country will choose a strictly
positive contribution already in period t and which type of early contribution is
preferred. The marginal e¤ects on (already positive) contribution levels are analyzed
in Appendix B.2.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that the irreversibility ratio  () := ct () =ct+1 () is
strictly decreasing in . Then, there are two country-specic thresholds
pi := 
 1  E  j  i and fi :=  1  E  i =
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such that the following holds for the preferred provision level in period t:
(i) If  < min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
, then country i prefers a provision Qit = 0 in period t,
i = A;B.
(ii) If   fi , then country i prefers a full provision Qit = (f 0) 1
 
ct=E
 
i

in
period t, i = A;B.
(iii) If E
 
i

= < E
 
j
 
i

, then pi < 
f
i and country i prefers a partial provi-
sion Qit 2
 
0; (f 0) 1
 
ct=E
 
i

for all  2 (pi ; fi ), i = A;B.
Proof. Notice that the irreversibility ratio  () 2 [0; 1] is a strictly decreasing
continuous function in . Lemma 4.1 identies the irreversibility thresholds which
determine when a positive provision level is preferred. As
 
E
 
i

=
 2 [0; 1] and
E
 
j
 
i
 2 [0; 1] and using the inverse function of  () ; then there exist two
country-specic thresholds which are dened by
pi := 
 1  E  j  i and fi :=  1  E  i = :
Consider rst the case (i) where  < min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
:
This means that ct () =ct+1 () >
 
E
 
i

=

and ct () =ct+1 ()  E
 
j
 
i

are fullled simultaneously and according to Lemma 4.1(ii)b), country i strictly
prefers a provision level of Qit = 0 in period t:
Now consider case (ii) where   fi : Given that  () is a strictly decreasing
function in ; this corresponds to a scenario where  () := ct=ct+1 <
 
E
 
i

=

:
Using Lemma 4.1(i), country i prefers a full provision in period t:
The same rationale can be employed for case (iii). As ct=ct+1 is strictly de-
creasing in , it follows that pi < 
f
i for E
 
i

= > E
 
j
 
i

: Thus, for  2
(pi ; 
f
i ) the irreversibility thresholds lie between E
 
j
 
i

> ct=ct+1 >
 
E
 
i

=

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and Lemma 4.1(ii)a) holds. This means that country i prefers a partial provision
Qit 2
 
0; (f 0) 1
 
ct=E
 
i

: Notice that, as shown in Lemma 4.1, when E
 
i

= >
E
 
j
 
i

and consequently pi > 
f
i ; then E
 
j
 
i

does not inuence the con-
tribution decision, and country i prefers a full provision for all  > fi .
Whether or not a country wants to contribute to the public good in period t
already crucially depends on the relation of the irreversibility ratio to the countrys
expected valuation and its expected probability of having the higher valuation. As
Lemma 4.1 has revealed, the relation of irreversibility ratio ct=ct+1 to this expected
probability E
 
j
 
i

determines whether a country prefers a partial provision in
t, and the relation of ct=ct+1 to the expected to maximum valuation ratio, E
 
i

=;
determines whether a country prefers a full provision of the public good in t. Thus,
investments in technology will have an e¤ect on the timing of the countriescontri-
butions if they change the irreversibility ratio ct=ct+1. Proposition 4.2 identies the
country-specic technology thresholds under which such investments in technology
shift from no contribution to a positive provision level and from a partial provision
level to a full provision level. Notice that we have added the superscript f and p, for
illustrational purposes, to signal the type of period t provision preferred by country
i: a partial provision in period t or a full provision in period t.
Su¢ cient for a shift of the preferred provision level towards an earlier provision is
that the irreversibility ratio ct=ct+1 is strictly decreasing over the interval [0; max]
of possible technology levels. This is the case if@ct@
 > ctct+1
@ct+1@
 : (4.17)
As ct=ct+1 < 1, even for the case when j@ct+1=@j > j@ct=@j ; the relative costs of
irreversibility can be perceived to increase which strengthens the incentive for an
early contribution. In other words, an absolute reduction of period t + 1 marginal
costs can be stronger than the absolute reduction of period t marginal costs.
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For investments i  fi , country i prefers a full provision in period t as the
irreversibility ratio becomes smaller than E
 
i

=. For low investment levels, where
 < min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
; the irreversibility ratio remains high and it is a strictly dominant
strategy for country i to wait until the uncertainty is resolved. For intermediate
investment levels, where  2 (pi ; fi ) and due to the fact that E
 
i

= can be
smaller or larger than E
 
j
 
i

, we need to distinguish between two cases which
are illustrated in Figure 4.1. If E
 
j
 
i
  E  i = then fi  pi . In this case,
E
 
j
 
i

and the corresponding technology threshold pi is not relevant for the
positive contribution decision, as country is preferred provision level in t will either
be zero or, based on its expected valuation, the full amount Qit = (f
0) 1
 
ct=E
 
i

.
For  < fi , Lemma 4.1(ii)a) holds and country i prefers not to contribute in period
t. For   fi , country i prefers a full provision already in period t.
If E
 
j
 
i

> E
 
i

=, then fi > 
p
i . For   pi ; country i prefers not to
contribute in period t; as the relative cost of waiting are not too high. Intermediate
investments in technology  2 (pi ; fi ) then lead to a scenario where only a partial
provision in period t is optimal for i. In this case, a positive period t+1 contribution
occurs with a positive probability. A further decrease in the irreversibility ratio,
due to a larger investment in cost-reducing technology ; shifts the optimal decision
towards a provision of the public good in t that crowds out any possible contribution
in t + 1: Thus, for a   fi technology level country i prefers a full provision in
period t.
Hence, one can distinguish between two occasions which constitute a categorical
change in the preferred contribution levels. The rst of which is an increase in cost-
reducing technology which changes a countrys preferred provision in period t from
zero to a positive amount; a "categorical change" in the equilibrium contribution can
take place when each country has a dominant strategy of not contributing in period
t at the initial technology level.
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Figure 4.1: Categorical changes in the preferred provision level for country i with
i 2 fA;Bg:
The second occasion is an investment in cost-reducing technology which changes
countriespreferred provision levels in t from a partial provision to a full provision.
In such a case, investments in technology can result in a situation where the contri-
butions in t crowd out all future contributions in t + 1; moreover, such investments
in technology can have an impact on the determination of the country that, in equi-
librium, has to pay the contribution cost of the early provision in t.
4.5.2 Technology sharing to free-ride
The assumption that all countries benet from the cost reductions caused by in-
vestments in green technology adds an interesting layer to the analysis. Countries
can choose a cost-reducing technology level that a¤ects the equilibrium contributions
such that the other country will bear the cost of an early provision of the public good.
Specically, countries can target a pre-determined technology range which allows one
country to free-ride on the other countrys contribution. We identify two cases where
a free-riding opportunity exists: in a situation where otherwise no contributions take
place in period t, and in a situation where, in the equilibrium without investments in
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Figure 4.2: Categorical changes for the case where E
 
j
 
i

>
 
E
 
i

=

is
fullled for both countries.
technology, one country already contributes in period t: In this section, we derive the
conditions for the existence of these "free-riding scenarios" by identifying the lowest
technology threshold needed which ensures a shift from one equilibrium to another.
Given that, in our model, the country-specic valuations for climate protection
can be asymmetrically distributed, it is clear that the thresholds pi and 
f
i for
i = fA;Bg will di¤er for each country. A merging of Figure 4.1 for the two countries,
thus, allows us to identify the irreversibility ratios and corresponding technology
ranges that are connected with the di¤erent equilibrium candidates introduced in
Proposition 4.1. An example is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Scenario 1: no contributions in period t: First, we consider the countries
incentive to invest in technology in a situation where, without cost-reducing technol-
ogy, there would be no contributionto the public good in period t, but both countries
prefer to delay their contributiona until period t + 1. Lemma 4.1(ii) has revealed
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that this will be the equilibrium if
E
 
i


<
ct (0)
ct+1 (0)
and E
 
j
 
i
  ct (0)
ct+1 (0)
for i = A;B. (4.18)
Proposition 4.3 Suppose that ct () =ct+1 () is strictly decreasing in  and
0 < min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
for i = A;B
such that without investments in technology, equilibrium contributions in period t are
zero. Dene i 2 fA;Bg and j 6= i such that
max

E
 
j
 
i

;
 
E
 
i

=
	
> max

E
 
j
 
i

;
 
E
 
i

=
	
. (4.19)
Then, for all investments in cost-reducing technology with
 2

min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
;min
n
pj ; 
f
j
o
,
the equilibrium contributions in period t satisfy (x it)

> 0 and
 
xjt

= 0.
Proof. If  > min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
, then i prefers at least a partial provision in t (i.e.,
Qit > 0), while  < min
n
pj ; 
f
j
o
implies that Qit = 0. Since the cost ratio ct=ct+1 is
strictly decreasing and with  () = ct () =ct+1 (),
max

E
 
j
 
i

;
 
E
 
i

=
	
= max
n
 (pi ) ; 

fi
o
,
and (4.19) is equivalent to min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
< min
n
pj ; 
f
j
o
. Hence, there is a non-
empty interval for  where (x it)

> 0 and i 2 fA;Bg is dened such that (4.19)
holds.
Proposition 4.3 addresses incentives to invest in cost-reducing technology in a
situation where actually both countries prefer to delay their contribution to climate
protection until period t + 1. In this case, a targeted provision of cost-reducing
technology  by country j can raise country is equilibrium contribution in period
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t from zero up to a strictly positive amount, while country j free-rides. The intu-
ition behind this incentive to invest in cost-reducing technology hinges on the fact
that countries are willing to endure di¤erent levels of the irreversibility ratio ct=ct+1
before they are willing to contribute in period t already. The early contribution of
i strictly decreases the expected burden of contributing that both countries face in
period t + 1. Thus, there is a range

min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
;min
n
pj ; 
f
j
o
of technology
levels where the irreversibility ratio decreases for both countries, but the preferred
provision level in t is raised only for one country from zero to a positive amount.
Consequently, this opportunity to benet from an early contribution of the other
country exists for the country which needs a lower irreversibility ratio to start de-
veloping a positive preferred period t provision level. Depending of the constellation
of E
 
j
 
i

and
 
E
 
i

=

of both countries, this will be the country that has
the lower expected valuation or the lower probability of learning to have the highest
valuation. Notice that it is unnecessary to distinguish between the type of positive
contribution reached: country j benets if i chooses a partial or a full provision of
the public good in period t. Also, notice that for min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
= min
n
pj ; 
f
j
o
; the
interval that can achieve such a scenario is empty. The resulting scenario, where
both country prefer a positive provision level in period t is analyzed in Scenario 2.
Scenario 2: positive equilibrium contribution in period t+1: Now consider
a situation where, without investment in technology, the equilibrium contributions
to the public good are such that in period t country j contributes a positive amount,
while country i free-rides and contributes zero. Investments in technology, however,
can cause a "categorical change" in the equilibrium and lead to the opposite scenario
where, in equilibrium, the previously non-contributing country i is now contributing
to climate protection.
Without investment in technology, (xit)

= 0 and
 
xjt

> 0 are assumed to hold.
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This is fullled if
E
 
i

= <
ct (0)
ct+1 (0)
and E
 
j
 
i
  ct (0)
ct+1 (0)
(4.20)
and
max
 
E
 
i
 
j

;
 
E
 
j

=

>
ct (0)
ct+1 (0)
(4.21)
or, equivalently,
min
n
pj ; 
f
j
o
< 0 < min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
, i 2 fA;Bg , j 6= i. (4.22)
Proposition 4.4 Suppose that ct () =ct+1 () is strictly decreasing in  and
min
n
pj ; 
f
j
o
< 0 < min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
, i 2 fA;Bg , j 6= i,
such that without investment in technology, country js equilibrium contribution in t
is strictly positive. If
E
 
i

> E
 
j

,
then for su¢ ciently high investments in cost-reducing technology, the equilibrium
contributions in period t satisfy (x it)

> 0 and
 
xjt

= 0.
Proof. Note rst that a technology level where is equilibrium contribution in t
is strictly positive can only exist if fj  min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
. To see why, suppose that
fj < min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
. Then, for all  where Qit > 0 (i.e.,   min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
), j prefers
a full provision of the public good in t; moreover, Qjt > Q
i
t because 
f
j < 
f
i is
equivalent to E
 
j

> E
 
i

. But then, is equilibrium contribution can never be
strictly positive. The condition fj  min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
directly implies that pj < 
p
i or
E
 
j
 
i

< E
 
i
 
j

, that is, even if i has the higher expected valuation, is
expected probability of having the lower valuation than j must be higher, too. Hence,
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it has to hold that fj  min
n
pi ; 
f
i
o
(which is guaranteed by the assumption of
E
 
i

> E
 
j

). Now consider the case where E
 
i

> E
 
j

. This implies that
fj > 
f
i . Moreover, it implies that (f
0) 1
 
ct=E
 
i

> (f 0) 1
 
ct=E
 
j

, i.e., the
full provision level preferred by i is strictly higher than the full provision level that
j prefers. Consequently, if  2
h
fi ; max
i
, then Qit must be strictly higher than Q
j
t
(independently of whether j prefers a full or a partial provision in t), and hence in
equilibrium,
 
x it

= (f 0) 1
 
ct=E
 
i

. (4.23)
If E
 
i

= < E
 
j
 
i

, then pi < 
f
i and there exists  > 0 su¢ ciently small
such that for all  2
h
fi   ; max
i
, Qit > Q
j
t and (x
i
t)

> 0, that is, the investment
in technology only needs to bring is preferred provision level su¢ ciently close to a
full provision in t.
Finally, note that E
 
i

> E
 
j

is su¢ cient but not necessary for obtaining the
result on the "categorical" change in the equilibrium. If pj < 0 < 
p
i < 
f
i < 
f
j ,
then E
 
i

< E
 
j

, and for  2
h
pj ; 
f
i

, both countries i and j prefer a partial
provision of the public good in t. Even if E
 
i

< E
 
j

, condition (4.14) can,
depending on the shape of the distribution functions, be positive which implies that
Qit > Q
j
t and (x
i
t)

= Qit > 0.
The mechanism driving this proposition is straightforward: As above, an invest-
ment in cost-reducing technology that a¤ects both countries can be used to alter
the irreversibility ratio and so, illicit a di¤erent optimal response in the public good
game. Country j might initially prefer a partial contribution in period t while i
prefers to wait, but investments in technology can change the trade-o¤ that both
countries face. If country i has the higher expected valuation, this shifts the burden
of contributing to country i, provided that both countries prefer an early contribution
(based on their expected valuation).
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Figure 4.3: An example of two cumulative distribution functions, where the condi-
tions for free-riding scenario 2 are fullled. Here, E
 
i

= 3 and E
 
j

= 2; while
E
 
j
 
i

= 0:44 and E
 
i
 
j

= 0:56:
In this second scenario, we capture a situation where the country that initially
expects a higher potential saving from an early contribution is actually the country
with the lower expected valuation for the public good. However, when a country
chooses a partial contribution in period t, it trades o¤ the marginal benet from an
early contribution (depending on the expected valuation) and the expected marginal
contribution cost in t + 1 which depend on the probability that it turns out it has
the higher valuation. As long as the country di¤erences in the expected valuation
for climate protection and the expected probability of having the higher valuation
do not go in the same direction, a targeted reduction of the irreversibility rate via
cost-reducing technology  can cause a "categorical change" in the equilibrium con-
tributions. An example for such probability distributions where E
 
j

< E
 
i

but
E
 
i
 
j

> E
 
j
 
i

is illustrated in Figure 4.3 using gamma distributions.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown how the timing of the contribution to climate protec-
tion is a¤ected by uncertainty, irreversibility, and the possibility to free ride. Uncer-
tainty about the country-specic benet of climate protection creates an incentive
to delay the contribution decision towards a later contribution date where the uncer-
tainty is resolved, while the irreversibility of damages makes an earlier contribution
more desirable. Furthermore, the fact that mitigation e¤orts are an international
public good shifts the contribution more strongly towards a later contribution date.
Specically, in anticipation of a free-riding possibility, countries prefer to shift their
contribution to a later date. Investments in cost-reducing technology have an im-
portant impact on the trade-o¤ that countries face and, hence, on the timing of the
contributions.
In the game of private contributions to the public good with potentially asym-
metric but known valuations for climate protection, the country with the highest
valuation for climate protection will face the burden of contributing. The fact that
countries have di¤erent expected probabilities of having the higher valuation in the
later period of the game makes them react di¤erently to changes in the degree of
irreversibility following investments in cost-reducing technology. The degree of irre-
versibility refers to the cost ratio of early and late contributions that are necessary
to provide a marginal unit of the public good, and the expected probability of having
the higher valuation in the later period can be interpreted as the potential saving
from an early contribution. Thus the country, which expects a higher potential sav-
ing from early contribution, will have a stronger incentive to contribute early and will
rst react to changes in the irreversibility rate. Consequently, a targeted investment
in cost-reducing technology can achieve a new equilibrium where one country can
free-ride on the early contribution of the other country. We have identied two such
scenarios, where such a potential for free-riding exists and investments in technology
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a¤ect the countriestiming of contributions. In the rst scenario, the current de-
gree of irreversibility would lead to a situation where the countries have a dominant
strategy of not contributing before the resolve of the uncertainty, and in the second
scenario, one country j would contribute already in period t. In both cases, an in-
vestment in cost-reducing technology by country j, which changes the irreversibility
rate, can lead to a situation where the other country i prefers an early provision of
the public good at a quantity which is higher than what country j prefers, and thus
in equilibrium country i free rides on country js early contribution. Notice that
di¤erent assumptions on the type of technology provided and hence on the e¤ect of
cost-reducing technology on the irreversibility rate can create an opposite situation
where investments in technology that most likely lead to much lower future contribu-
tion cost shift the equilibrium contributions towards a later date. In this model, we
have chosen investments in green technologies that already a¤ect current contribution
costs and, thus, modelling the argument that, by strengthening the other countries
incentive to contribute early, providing such technologies may be benecial, due to
the public good nature of climate protection.
In our model framework, investments in technology can achieve a discrete jump in
the countriesequilibrium contributions and hence a discrete change in the investing
countrys payo¤. Moreover, in the two scenarios considered, the cost-reducing tech-
nology strictly increases the quantity of the public good provided early and hence
the overall amount contributed to climate protection: First, for a given valuation,
optimal early contributions are strictly higher than late contributions because of
the lower contribution cost, and second, early contributions also occur in situations
where a countrys valuation turns out to be low. (If the valuation turns out to be
high, the country can still increase its contribution in the late period.) Both e¤ects
make the equilibrium quantity of the public good higher the higher the provision in
the early period. From a welfare perspective, such increases in the total quantity
provided are desirable, due to the underprovision of the public good in the equilib-
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rium of private contributions. Since the countriesmarginal contribution cost within
a given period are assumed to be the same and our analysis abstracts from income
e¤ects, it does not matter for welfare which country contributes in equilibrium. Even
if, ex post, a country has over-contributed from an individual perspective because
its early contribution has been higher than what would have been optimal based on
the true valuation, such overcontributions from an individual perspective are typi-
cally welfare-increasing, due to the underprovision of the public good. A complete
welfare analysis would of course also have to take into account the cost of providing
cost-reducing technologies, but the shift of the countriesequilibrium contributions
towards early contributions will typically have a positive e¤ect on welfare.
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A.1 Data Appendix
Tax Haven list.
Source: Hines and Rice (1994) and OECD (2000).
Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba*, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados,
Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus,
Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Hong Kong**, Ireland**, Isle of Man,
Jersey, Jordan*, Lebanon*, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg**, Macao**, Mal-
dives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius*, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru*, Nether-
lands Antilles, Niue*, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, Samoa*, San Marino*, Seychelles*, Singapore**, Switzerland**,
Tonga*, Turks and Caicos Islands, Vanuatu, Virgin Islands (U.S).*
* : Appears only in the OECD (2000) list.
**: Appears only in the Hines and Rice (1994) list.
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OECD countries.
Source: OECD.
Available at www.oecd.org
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlads, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States.
Agreement form.
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation Database and OECD Global
Forum for Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes.
Available at http://eoi-tax.org/
Bilateral categorical variable indicating 0 if no agreement has been signed between a
tax haven and a OECD country, 1 if a DTC which meets the international standards
and has the strong information exchange article (Paragraph 4 and 5 of Article 26)
and 2 if a TIEA has been signed.
GDP.
Source: the World Banks Development Indicators (WDI).
Available at http://data.worldbank.org/
Data are in current U.S. dollars, for 2006. Dollar gures for GDP are converted from
domestic currencies using single year o¢ cial exchange rates. For a few countries
where the o¢ cial exchange rate does not reect the rate e¤ectively applied to actual
foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used. For countries
and territories for which GDP data are missing in WDI, Data from the UNs National
Accounts Main Aggregates Database is used http://data.un.org/
111
Appendix A. Appendix to Chapter 3
Governance Index.
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005).
This index is obtained by the taking the unweighted mean of the 6 available gov-
ernance measures constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2005) for the year 2009. It is
a continuous variable over the approximate interval (-2.5, 2.5), normalized to have
mean 0 and standard deviation 1, with higher values indicating better governance.
Data is available for only 42 tax haven jurisdictions.
O¢ cial Development Aid Eligibility.
Source: OECD Development Cooperation Directorate.
Indicator variable (=1 if a country is on the 2006 DAC List of ODA Recipients).The
DAC List of ODA Recipients shows all countries and territories eligible to receive
o¢ cial development assistance (ODA). These consist of all low and middle income
countries based on gross national income (GNI) per capita as published by the World
Bank, with the exception of G8 members, EU members, and countries with a rm
date for entry into the EU. The list also includes all of the Least Developed Countries
(LDCs) as dened by the United Nations (UN).
Foreign Direct Investment, net outow (% of GDP).
Source: the World Banks Development Indicators (WDI)
Available at http://data.worldbank.org/
This variable shows net outows of investment from the reporting economy to the
rest of the world and is divided by GDP for the year 2006. Foreign direct investment
are the net inows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent
or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of
the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term
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capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments.
Di¤erence in GDP per capita.
Source: the World Banks Development Indicators (WDI).
Available at http://data.worldbank.org/
Variable is constructed using the absolute value of the di¤erence between a given
country pairs GDP per capita.
Data are in current U.S. dollars, for 2006. Dollar gures for GDP are converted from
domestic currencies using single year o¢ cial exchange rates. For a few countries
where the o¢ cial exchange rate does not reect the rate e¤ectively applied to actual
foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used. For countries
and territories for which GDP per capita data are missing in WDI, Data from the
UNs National Accounts Main Aggregates Database is used http://data.un.org/
Bilateral Portfolio Outow.
Source: IMFs Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS).
Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm.
Geographic breakdown of total portfolio investment assets from OECD countries to
tax havens in current million U.S dollars, for 2006.
Bilateral FDI.
Source: OECD International direct investment database.
Available at http://stats.oecd.org.
The sum of inward and outward foreign direct investment ows from OECD countries
to tax havens. Data is measured in millions U.S dollars, for year 2006.
113
Appendix A. Appendix to Chapter 3
Treaty before 1998.
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation Database.
Indicator variable (=1 if a country pair had a tax treaty in force before 1998).
Distance.
Source: GEODist Database (CEPII) available at http://www.cepii.fr.
Variable measures simple distances in km which uses the latitudes and longitudes of
the most important cities/agglomerations.
Common language.
Source: GEODist Database (CEPII) available at http://www.cepii.fr.
Indicator variable (=1 if more than 9% of population of each country pair speak the
same language).
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A.2 Summary Statistics
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Unilateral Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ODA Eligibility 76 0.342105 0.4775669 0 1
World Goverance Index Average 69 0.78164 0.6446449 -0.8911266 1.81754
FDI net outow (%GDP) 61 1.95E+10 4.15E+10 -7.E+09 2.E+11
GDP 76 5.34E+11 1.67E+12 2.E+07 1.E+13
GDP per capita 76 27704.07 25229.52 185 132234
Bilateral Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Di¤erence in GDP per capita 1323 25589.26 21243.53 71 124547
Bilateral Portfolio Outow 942 7637.43 38508.35 -20 543887
Bilateral FDI 848 1563.651 12508 -4591.076 214303
Treaty before 1998 1323 0.139834 0.346 0 1
Distance 1323 4243752 31262 7932 9985533
Common Language 1323 0.270597 0.44443 0 1
Common Savings Tax Directive 1323 0.256991 0.43714 0 1
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B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
By an envelope theorem, 0i

xit; ^ (x
t
i)

= @i=@x
t
i, which yields
0i
 
xit

=
R 
^
j
 
i

ct+1di
 
i

+
R ^
0
R ^
0
if 0 (Xt) dj
 
j

di
 
i
  ct if 0  Xt < Qt+1
 


E
 
i

f 0 (Xt)  ct if Xt  Qt+1
 


where ^ = ct+1=f 0 (Xt). Moreover,
00i
 
xit

=
h
j

^

  ^0j

^
i R ^
0
if 00 (Xt) di
 
i

if 0  Xt < Qt+1
 


E
 
i

f 00 (Xt) if Xt  Qt+1
 

 :
Hence, if Assumption 1 holds, then 00i (x
i
t)  0 for all Xt.
Case (i): Suppose
 
E
 
i

=
  ct
ct+1
. This implies that
0i
 
Qit+1
 


= E
 
A

f 0
 
QAt+1
 

  ct
= E
 
A

f 0

(f 0) 1
 
ct+1=
  ct > 0:
117
Appendix B. Appendix to Chapter 4
and Qit  Qt+1
 


.
Hence, 0A (Q
i
t) = 0 is uniquely solved for (Q
i
t)

= (f 0) 1
 
ct=E
 
i

. Since
Qit  Qt+1
 


, there will be no contribution in t+ 1.
Case (ii):
 
E
 
i

=

< ct
ct+1
. This implies that
0A
 
Qit+1
 


= E
 
i

f 0
 
Qit+1
 

  ct
= E
 
i

f 0

(f 0) 1
 
ct+1=
  ct < 0:
Hence, Qit < Qt+1
 


. In turn, since Qt+1
 


is the highest types preferred con-
tribution level in t + 1, there is strictly positive probability that there will be a
contribution in t+ 1.
Thus,
0i (0) =
Z 
0
j
 
i

ct+1di
 
i
  ct > 0
is su¢ cient for Qit > 0 (part (ii)b).
If instead either (1) 0i (0) < 0 or (2) 
0
i (0) = 0 and 
00
i (0) < 0, then Q
i
t = 0 (part
(ii)a). If, however, 0i (0) = 0 and Assumption 1 holds with equality for  2 [0; 0],
0 > 0, then 0i (x) = 0 for all x 2 [0; Qt+1 (0)], and i is indi¤erent between all period
t contribution levels Qit 2 [0; Qt+1 (0)]. (Note that this does not necessarily imply
that i is indi¤erent between all contributions xit 2 [0; Qt+1 (0)], but xit = 0 is at least
weakly preferred to all contributions xit.) To include this special case in part (i), we
assume that in this latter case Qit = 0.
118
Appendix B. Appendix to Chapter 4
B.2 E¤ect of technology on (positive) contribu-
tion levels
An analysis of the e¤ect of a cost-reducing technology  on the optimal contribution
levels concentrates on an initial positive preferred contribution level.
Consider the e¤ect of a marginal improvement of technology  in the two-country
scenario. Let i; j = A;B and i 6= j and suppose that Qit > 0; then a marginal increase
in cost-reducing technology  strictly increases Qit if@ct@
 >
 Z 
^
 
j
 
i

di
 
i

+ 0j

^

i

^

E

iji  ^
! @ct+1@
 : (B.1)
Proof.
Consider rst the case of
 
E
 
i

=
  (ct=ct+1). Here, Qit = (f 0) 1  ct=  E  i
and
@
@
Qit =
1
E
 
i

f 00 (Qit)
@ct
@
> 0
if and only if @ct=@ < 0, which holds by assumption.
Second, if
 
E
 
i

=

< (ct=ct+1), then Qit is determined as in Lemma 4.1(i).
Totally di¤erentiating yields
@Qit
@
=  
@ct
@
 
R 
^
 
j
 
i

di
 
i

+ 0j

^

i

^

E

iji  ^

@ct+1
@
00i (Q
i
t)
(B.2)
and hence (B.1) is necessary and su¢ cient for @ (Qit) =@ > 0 if
 
E
 
i

=

<
(ct=ct+1).
Hence, (B.1) is su¢ cient for @ (Qit) =@ > 0.
Moving on to the contribution level decision in period t + 1: Di¤erentiating the
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expected optimal contribution in t+1 with respect to  yields
@E
  
xit+1

@
=
Z 
^
Z i
0
  
1
if 00
 
f 0 1
 
ct+1
i
 @ct+1
@
!
  @X

t
@
!
dj
 
j

di
 
i

;
where a decrease in marginal contribution costs ct+1 through an increase in  is
fully passed on to the optimal contribution level but where an increase in  that rst
a¤ected the equilibrium contributions Xt in period t crowds out such contributions:
Consequently, the e¤ect of a marginal increase in  on the expected contribution in
period t+ 1 is ambiguous.
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